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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Introduction 
Following the implementation of the government’s fuel poverty strategy in 2001, 
Warm Front is expected to make a substantial contribution to reducing the number of 
fuel poor households – those unable to afford to heat their homes adequately1. This 
report focuses on the targeting of the scheme in England and how this might be 
modified to help achieve the government’s target of eliminating fuel poverty among 
vulnerable households by 2010, based largely on the recommendations in a recent 
National Audit Office report on Warm Front, which highlighted the relatively small 
overlap between eligibility for the scheme and fuel poverty.  
 
This is a forward-looking piece of research and, as such, is not intended to be critical 
of the way the scheme has operated to date. Warm Front, like its predecessor the 
Home Energy Efficiency Scheme, was not originally designed to alleviate fuel 
poverty but to improve the energy efficiency of homes occupied by vulnerable 
households – those containing pensioners, children, and/or someone with a long-
standing illness or disability. By this yardstick, the scheme has been a success - up to 
February 2004, approximately 770,000 vulnerable households had received a Warm 
Front grant, worth an average of £445 (in 2002) and saving each of these households 
up to £150 a year on their fuel bills. Whilst it would be unfair to evaluate the past 
performance of this scheme against an objective that it was not set up to achieve, it is 
reasonable to ask how far the current scheme is likely to contribute towards meeting a 
new or modified objective in future (i.e. the reduction of fuel poverty) and what 
changes could be made to increase this impact.  
 
The report examines the characteristics of Warm Front recipients; estimates the 
impact of the current scheme on fuel poverty, as officially defined; models the likely 
effectiveness of various options for redesigning Warm Front in terms of their impact 
on fuel poverty; and explores the extent of and implications of ‘churn’.  
 
Targeting of Warm Front 
For the scheme to be well-targeted on fuel poverty, the characteristics of grant 
recipients should closely match those of fuel poor households. So, for example, if 
over 40% of fuel poor households are single pensioner households then, other things 
being equal, over 40% of grants should be going to single pensioners. Although grant 
recipients are more similar to fuel poor households than private sector households in 
general, those groups who are most likely to be fuel poor are still substantially under-
represented among Warm Front recipients, including single pensioners, occupants of 
less energy efficient dwellings, and low income households. Furthermore, the 
proportion of grants allocated to all three groups has been declining over the period 
covered by this analysis – from April 2000 to the end of 2003 (see Table 3.1).  
 
Single pensioners are more likely to meet the eligibility criteria than other types of 
household, but are less likely to apply than other eligible households. Single 
pensioners comprise around a third of all eligible households, but less than a quarter 
of Warm Front grant recipients (see Figure 3.2), although they do receive larger 
grants, on average. This suggests that other factors are reducing the number of 
applications from this ‘high risk’ group. The reasons for this are not well understood, 
                                                          
1 A household is defined as being in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, it 
would be required to spend more than 10% of its income on all household fuel use. 
 v
but it could be that single pensioners are less likely to hear about the scheme, less 
likely to value its potential benefits, and/ or more likely to be concerned about 
possible disruption. Additional efforts should be made to understand and address 
these and other possible barriers to potential applicants.  
 
Households living in the least energy efficient homes are more likely to apply for a 
grant than other qualifying households, perhaps because they stand to benefit most 
from the scheme. But this ‘self-selection’ effect is not sufficiently strong for targeting 
purposes: dwellings with a very low energy efficiency rating – a SAP rating of less 
than 30 - constitute 14% of all eligible households and 21% of Warm Front recipients, 
but 40% of all fuel poor households (see Figure 3.3).  The proportion of grants 
allocated to less energy efficient homes is unlikely to increase dramatically unless 
specific mechanisms are put in place to prioritise these dwellings.  
 
Grants are skewed towards low income households, but again much less skewed than 
the distribution of fuel poor households (see Figure 3.4). This is partly because 
means-tested benefits are an imperfect proxy for low income, but also because not all 
the qualifying benefits are means-tested. A large and growing share of grants – up to 
38% in 2003 - went to households that qualify on account of a non means-tested 
disability-related benefit and a further 21% of grants in that year went to households 
in receipt of the Working Families Tax Credit, few of whom are in fuel poverty, 
according to the official definition. The Disability Living Allowance was not on the 
original list of ‘passport’ benefits and its subsequent inclusion may explain why the 
share of grants to disabled households appears to have risen over the period covered 
by this analysis. The way benefit receipt is recorded in the Eaga database may also 
over-state the share of grants to this particular sub-group, although this is less likely to 
explain the rising share over time.  
 
There also appears to be a substantial and growing regional imbalance in the 
distribution of grants, which raises concerns about equity. Within the areas covered by 
Eaga Ltd, the North East and North West comprise around a third of all eligible 
households and about the same proportion of those in fuel poverty, yet they receive 
over half of all grants (see Figure 3.5). One reason is that the regional targets set for 
Warm Front were apparently based on a misrepresentation of the geographical 
distribution of fuel poverty. In addition, the methods used to market the scheme, 
including informal ‘word-of-mouth’, may have been more effective in some regions 
than others.     
 
It is estimated that just less than one in five Warm Front recipients are fuel poor prior 
to receiving a grant (see Table 3.2). Grant recipients are around three times as likely 
to be fuel poor as other private sector households, so the scheme is already being 
targeted with some success at fuel poor households. However, most recipients – 
around four in five - are probably not fuel poor and this proportion appears to have 
been rising over time, because of changes in the composition of grant recipients (see 
above). This estimate differs significantly from figures quoted in other studies of 
Warm Front, which report a much higher incidence of fuel poverty among assisted 
households. The estimate produced by the Energy Audit Company – between 30 and 
44% of grant recipients in fuel poverty - is based on the same data set, but uses a 
different measure of income than used here and in the government’s official definition 
of fuel poverty (see Section 3.4 and Table B2) which would account for most of the 
discrepancy between our respective estimates. It is more difficult to reconcile our 
estimates with other studies, because they are less well documented, although the 
quality of the income data used in some of these studies is rather weak. 
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Impact of Warm Front 
According to the results of the simulation model, the first four years of the Warm 
Front programme - with a budget of approximately £600 million over the period 2000 
to 2004 - should contribute to a small, but significant, reduction in the fuel poverty 
gap among private sector vulnerable households in the order of 7% (or a reduction of 
around 60,000 in the number of vulnerable fuel poor households). If the programme 
continued at the same level of funding for a further four years, this would reduce the 
fuel poverty gap by an estimated 15% - around 2 percentage points higher if the 
funding increases announced in July 2004 are factored in.  
 
The reason the scheme’s impact is not larger is that many grant recipients are not fuel 
poor and because not enough grants are going to people living in the least energy 
efficient homes, where investment in energy efficiency improvements is generally 
most cost-effective. However, this also reflects the scale of the problem to be 
addressed and the need also to tackle the other causes of fuel poverty, in particular 
low household incomes. There are inevitably limits to what can be achieved through 
energy efficiency measures alone. Even if every vulnerable fuel poor household were 
to receive all the measures currently available under Warm Front, there would still be 
substantial levels of ‘residual’ fuel poverty; according to the model, the maximum 
achievable reduction in the fuel poverty gap would be around 40%. And even if more 
expensive measures were made available – for example, a special package for ‘hard-
to-heat’ homes - it would not be possible to eliminate fuel poverty among very low 
income households. 
 
Nevertheless, there is substantial scope for increasing the impact on fuel poverty 
through improved targeting of grants. The Figure below shows the potential impact of 
various options for redesigning Warm Front on the size of the fuel poverty gap among 
private sector vulnerable households (based on an overall programme budget of £600 
million). Only a small increase in the impact of the scheme would be achieved by 
excluding households not in receipt of a means-tested benefit or by excluding those 
living in homes that are already energy efficient (with a SAP rating of 60 or more). 
Combining these two measures would have a more substantial effect. Of the other less 
radical options considered in this report, the most promising would be to install 
significant measures only in those dwellings that fail the thermal comfort criterion of 
the Decent Homes standard (as a crude proxy for low energy efficiency) or to 
introduce an average SAP improvement target, giving scheme managers an incentive 
to target less energy efficient dwellings. These options would all have broadly the 
same impact on the fuel poverty gap - a reduction of between 11-12% - though in 
different ways.  
 
To make a more substantial difference, more radical changes are needed, such as the 
introduction of a much lower SAP threshold (at around 30) or a fuel poverty ‘check’ 
to ensure that grants are only offered to households identified as being fuel poor. In 
both cases, the initial eligibility criteria would need to be extended in order to 
generate a large enough pool of potential applicants. (Without this, the scheme would 
soon run out of potential clients that met the more restrictive eligibility criteria.) The 
assumption made in this analysis is that all pensioner households would be made 
eligible, as is already the case in Scotland. These proposals would increase the 
scheme’s impact on fuel poverty by a factor of three or so, although they would also 
increase the administrative complexity of the scheme. In particular, these options 
would involve higher survey costs and/or other potentially expensive methods of 
screening out those unlikely to be at risk of fuel poverty.  
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* Only covering those who are in receipt of a means-tested benefit. 
** Set at about twice the average improvement in SAP ratings under the current scheme to date. 
*** All over 60s included in Warm Front Plus. 
Note: the fuel poverty gap is a measure of fuel poverty that takes into account both the numbers in fuel 
poverty and the depth or severity of their fuel poverty (see Figure 4.2 and accompanying explanation). 
 
 
There is almost inevitably a trade-off between improved targeting and higher 
operating costs. This study helps to quantify the potential benefits of a more targeted 
scheme, which can then be weighed against the additional costs of administering such 
a scheme, which are not quantified in this report. 
 
Implications of churn 
There is considerable movement into and out of fuel poverty (or ‘churn’) over time, 
largely driven by changes in households’ financial circumstances. This could have 
important policy implications if, as seems appropriate, the greatest concern is for 
households who are in persistent fuel poverty. Over a ‘typical’ five year period in the 
early 1990s (with rising incomes, but relatively stable fuel prices), over 40% of 
dwellings that were initially occupied by a fuel poor household were no longer 
occupied by a fuel poor household at the end of the period. At the same time, around 
12% of dwellings that did not contain a fuel poor household at the start of the period 
did contain one five years later.  
 
According to a separate large-scale household survey, there is also substantial year-
on-year movement into and out of fuel poverty. Around 18% of households 
experienced ‘expenditure fuel poverty’ at some point over a four year period 
(1997/98-2000/01), but only just over 4% of households were ‘persistently’ fuel poor 
in at least three out of the four years. Thus, for the majority of people who experience 
fuel poverty, it appears to be a transitory phenomenon. However, cases of persistent 
fuel poverty account for a much higher proportion of those households observed to be 
fuel poor at any given point in time - of these, nearly half (44%) were experiencing 
persistent fuel poverty (see Table 5.2).    
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Evidence from both surveys suggests that single pensioners stand out as being much 
more likely than other types of household to experience persistent fuel poverty. Low 
income households and occupants of less energy efficient homes are also more likely 
than average to experience persistent fuel poverty, whilst couples with children have 
very low rates of persistent fuel poverty (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). This strengthens 
the case for targeting certain types of household, in particular single pensioners.    
 
‘Churn’ makes little difference to the long-term effectiveness of Warm Front, as 
currently designed. On the one hand, some of those grant recipients who were fuel 
poor would have moved out of fuel poverty even in the absence of the scheme; on the 
other hand, some grants that appeared to be ‘wasted’ on non fuel poor households will 
have prevented some of these households from falling into fuel poverty in future  
years. These two effects cancel each other out. 
 
There is some reduction in the effectiveness of more targeted schemes due to ‘churn’, 
but this effect is relatively small over a five year period, compared with the initial 
impact of these proposals. Taking ‘churn’ into account dilutes to a small extent, but 
does not negate, the potential benefits of better targeting (see Table 5.3 and 
accompanying text). It follows that targeting remains an important priority for Warm 
Front even after allowing for the ‘churn’ of fuel poor households.    
 
Conclusions 
There are broadly two sets of options for redesigning the Warm Front scheme to more 
closely reflect the government’s fuel poverty objectives. The first would produce a 
modest increase in the scheme’s impact on fuel poverty by tightening the eligibility 
criteria to exclude those groups least likely to be in fuel poverty, including those who 
are not in receipt of a means-tested benefit, and by excluding those in homes that are 
already energy efficient; neither change would have much impact on its own. A more 
flexible alternative, and potentially as effective, would be to set an average SAP 
improvement target to encourage scheme managers to skew grants towards those 
living in the least energy efficient homes, although this leaves open the mechanism(s) 
they would use to meet their target and whether this could be done without 
significantly altering the operating ‘norms’ of the current scheme. Excluding all 
dwellings that already meet the Decent Homes standard would have a similar impact 
on fuel poverty and would tie the scheme in neatly with the government’s broader 
housing agenda.    
 
The second set of options would require more radical changes to the nature of the 
scheme, but with a much larger potential impact on fuel poverty. These options would 
be designed to target grants much more narrowly than at present on households at 
greatest risk of being fuel poor, either by restricting grants to those living in the least 
energy efficient homes (with a SAP rating of 30 or less) or by carrying out a prior 
assessment of each applicant’s dwelling and income and only allocating grants to 
those identified as being fuel poor. In both cases, the initial eligibility criteria would 
need to be extended, for example to cover all pensioner households, in order to 
generate a large enough pool of potential applicants. The benefits, which are 
potentially very large, need to be weighed against the additional administrative costs, 
as well as other ‘political’ or pragmatic considerations.    
 
Aside from the eligibility criteria, more should be done to try to increase the share of 
grants going to single pensioners and, in particular, to understand and overcome any 
barriers that seem to be inhibiting applications from this ‘high risk’ group.  
 
 ix
In evaluating the scheme, it is important that the effects of the scheme are monitored 
on a more consistent basis than in the past, based on a more standardised approach to 
defining and measuring incomes (in terms of identifying whether recipients are fuel 
poor) and to estimating potential fuel savings (in terms of identifying whether 
recipients are lifted out of fuel poverty).  
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context for research 
  
The government recently published its second annual report on progress towards 
meeting the objectives set out in its Fuel Poverty Strategy (Defra, 2004). The target 
for England is to seek an end to fuel poverty for vulnerable households2 as far as 
reasonably practicable by 2010 and to eliminate fuel poverty among all households as 
far as reasonably practicable by 2016. According to the principal definition used by 
the Government, a household is in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory 
heating regime, it would be required to spend more than 10% of its income, including 
Housing Benefit or ISMI3 on all household fuel use. The report shows a further fall in 
the number of fuel poor households on this measure - from 1.7 million households in 
2001 to 1.4 million households in 2002. In 1996, there were over 4 million fuel poor 
households in England.  
 
Much of the fall in the number of fuel poor households over recent years can be 
attributed to energy price reductions and rising incomes. The trend decline in fuel 
prices is not expected to continue - indeed gas and electricity prices have both risen 
sharply in recent months. The contribution of energy efficiency schemes is therefore 
intended to grow over the next few years. Warm Front, which is the Government’s 
largest of these energy efficiency schemes, was launched in June 2000 with an annual 
budget of around £150 million for its first four years. This was increased in the latest 
spending round announced in July 2004, which awarded an additional £45 million in 
the second year of the new settlement and £95 million in the third year (on top of the 
£150 million per annum already allocated by Defra). 
 
Last year, the National Audit Office (NAO) completed a review of Warm Front, 
focusing in particular on its effectiveness in tackling fuel poverty. Although it was 
acknowledged that Warm Front has made a difference to a large number of 
households in England, the NAO identified three important ways in which the scheme 
could be improved (NAO, 2003):  
 
• problems with the match between the eligibility of the scheme and fuel 
poverty: many of the fuel poor may be ineligible and the majority of eligible 
households may not be fuel poor; 
 
• the heating and insulation measures available under the scheme may be 
insufficient to move households out of fuel poverty; and 
 
• only a relatively small proportion of grants are reaching the least energy 
efficient homes.  
 
                                                          
2 A vulnerable household is defined here, as in the Fuel Poverty Strategy, as being any household with a 
member aged 60 or over, a child under the age of 16 or a member who is disabled or has a long term 
illness.  
3 Income Support for Mortgage Interest. 
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As a result, the NAO conclude that the scheme may make less of a contribution to the 
fuel poverty strategy’s aim of eliminating fuel poverty than it could, although the 
report also recognises that, in part, these areas for improvement have their origins in 
the scheme’s history (see below).  
 
More recently, the Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, a non-departmental public body that 
advises government on progress in delivering its fuel poverty strategy, has argued that 
the criticisms of targeting have been “seriously overdone” and that “there are limits to 
the extent to which the fuel poor can and should be ‘pinpointed’ by the schemes” 
(FPAG, 2004). They claim that the focus of the scheme could be improved by 
excluding dwellings that are already energy efficient but, that beyond a certain point, 
the following should be borne in mind: 
 
• households who are on low incomes, but not currently fuel poor, may become 
fuel poor in a few years’ time, because of changes in household circumstances. 
Improving their home now may prevent them falling into fuel poverty in 
future; 
 
• more precise targeting will increase the complexity of the scheme and there is 
a danger that some households who need help will be put off by this; 
 
• all those helped by the current scheme are on low incomes or disabled (even if 
they are not fuel poor) and that better targeting may risk “robbing Peter to pay 
Paul”. 
 
Defra is considering both reports and developing a Fuel Poverty Implementation Plan 
for England, which is expected to include proposals for revising the design of Warm 
Front.  
 
This report is a forward-looking piece of research which is not intended to be critical 
of the way the scheme has operated to date. Warm Front, like its predecessor the 
Home Energy Efficiency Scheme, was not initially designed to alleviate fuel poverty 
but to achieve general improvements in domestic energy efficiency (and even the new 
scheme was in place well before the Fuel Poverty Strategy was launched in February 
2001). By this yardstick, the scheme has performed well. Up to February 2004, 
approximately 770,000 vulnerable households have received assistance under the 
scheme. The average grant in 2002 was worth £445, which should save each of these 
households up to £150 a year through reductions in their fuel bills.  
 
Whilst it would be unfair to evaluate the past performance of this scheme against an 
objective that it was not originally designed to achieve, it is reasonable to ask how far 
the current scheme is likely to contribute to meeting a new or modified objective (i.e. 
the reduction of fuel poverty) and what changes could be made to increase its impact. 
 
 
1.2  Aims of research 
 
This report addresses many of the issues raised in the NAO report, focusing on how 
the targeting of the scheme might be improved in order to have a greater impact on 
fuel poverty within the constraints on resources. It also addresses some of the 
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concerns about targeting identified in the FPAG report, including the need to take into 
account movements into and out of fuel poverty over time. This builds on earlier work 
by the author of this report, which highlighted poor targeting as a problem of the 
current scheme (Sefton, 2002). The main purpose of the report is to model the impact 
of various proposals for re-designing the Warm Front scheme, based on the following 
recommendations from the NAO report: 
 
• reviewing the effectiveness of the scheme’s eligibility provisions to identify 
the extent to which they may exclude the vulnerable fuel poor and the extent 
to which they may direct funds to those who are not fuel poor; 
 
• giving consideration to how resources can be concentrated on homes with the 
lowest energy efficiency; 
 
• carrying out research into whether Warm Front has moved assisted households 
out of fuel poverty; 
 
• setting targets that are framed around the average improvement in energy 
efficiency of households assisted, as a proxy for the impact on underlying fuel 
poverty4.  
 
 
1.3. Outline of report 
 
The next chapter examines the characteristics of households assisted under the Warm 
Front scheme to date, using a large database of grant recipients provided by Eaga Ltd, 
who are responsible for managing Warm Front for a large part of England. This 
allows a detailed assessment of how the current scheme is being targeted and is used 
to provide a more accurate estimate of the proportion of grants going to fuel poor 
households.  
 
Chapter 3 starts by estimating the impact of the current Warm Front scheme on fuel 
poverty, as recommended in the NAO report. It then goes on to model the likely 
effectiveness of various options for improving the targeting of the scheme, including, 
for example, the introduction of a SAP threshold (above which dwellings would not 
be eligible for a grant). The same model can also be used to estimate the impact of 
increasing the Warm Front budget, since one of the recommendations in the FPAG 
report is that expenditure on this programme should be increased by at least 50% if 
the Government is to meet its fuel poverty objectives.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of movements into and out of fuel poverty over time - 
sometimes referred to as ‘churn’. As recognised in my previous research and in the 
NAO report, the fuel poor are a dynamic group with new households becoming fuel 
poor each year, which makes the task of eliminating fuel poverty more challenging. 
This chapter estimates the impact of ‘churn’ on the effectiveness of Warm Front and 
the implications, if any, for how the scheme should be targeted.  
 
                                                          
4 Current performance targets are based on the number of households assisted and not those removed 
from fuel poverty. This does not provide an incentive for scheme managers to reach the worst homes or 
those most in need. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
 
TARGETING ISSUES 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
A well-targeted scheme is one that benefits a high proportion of the targeted group (in 
this case fuel poor households), whilst minimising the number of beneficiaries who do 
not fall into the target group. In the case of Warm Front, efficient targeting would 
ensure the scheme had a greater impact on fuel poverty, without ‘wasting’ resources 
on households that were not fuel poor. Grants to households that are not fuel poor still 
benefit these households in terms of lower heating bills or warmer homes, but do not 
contribute to the government’s objective of eliminating fuel poverty. For the moment, 
we leave aside the complication that some households that are not currently fuel poor 
may become fuel poor in future years and vice-versa.  
 
Figure 2.1 re-produces a diagram from the NAO report, but with estimates of numbers 
attached to each group, using data from the (latest) 2001 English House Condition 
Survey. This demonstrates the degree of mismatch between the measures available 
under the current scheme and the needs of fuel poor households, which appears to be 
even greater than suggested in the NAO report.  
 
 
2.2   Fuel poor and eligible households 
 
According to these estimates, only around 400,000 households are both fuel poor and 
eligible for significant measures5 under the current Warm Front scheme – or less than 
a third of all fuel poor households in the owner-occupied or private rented sectors. 
This may be a slight under-estimate, because it is based on a more restricted set of 
measures than is available under Warm Front - the installation of fixed heaters, for 
example, is not included in this analysis, because of modelling constraints (see section 
4.1). On the other hand, Warm Front applicants sometimes refuse measures that are 
potentially available to them, so not all of these households would receive these 
measures in practice. Furthermore, even some of those households that receive 
‘significant’ measures, as defined here, would experience only a relatively small 
improvement in the energy efficiency of their homes, in particular those whose loft 
insulation is topped up and no more.  
 
 
2.3   Fuel poor and ineligible households 
 
More than two thirds of those in fuel poverty in the private sector - about one million 
households - stand to benefit little if at all from Warm Front, as currently designed. 
This is twice as high as the figure quoted in the summary of the NAO report. These 
households fall into one of four categories:  
 
5 One or more of the following: new central heating, cavity wall insulation or loft insulation. 
6Figure 2.1:  Mismatch between eligibility for Warm Front and fuel poverty in England 
      
Already energy efficient  
Not on low income and/or 
living in relatively energy 
efficient home  
1,290,000 
Significant 
measures available 
to fuel poor 
households   
400,000 
       No significant measures available under Warm Front  
Non-vulnerable 
groups  
220,000 
Not claiming or not 
eligible for passport 
benefits  
650,000 20,000 
640,000    100,000  
380,000 
Potential Warm Front recipients 
2,820,000 
Fuel poor households 
1,390,000 
 Source: own analysis using 2001 English House Condition Survey 
N.B. Owner-occupied and private rented sector households only. Figures are rounded to the nearest ten thousand and may not add up due to rounding. 
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• a relatively small number of them (around 20,000) are living in homes that are 
already energy efficient (defined here as having a SAP rating of 60 or more). 
They are fuel poor because their incomes are very low and/or they are under-
occupying their home. Their fuel poverty needs to be addressed by other 
means than energy efficiency improvements; 
 
• a further 100,000 households meet the qualifying criteria for the scheme, but 
would not receive any significant measures under the scheme, even though 
most of these homes have a below average energy efficiency rating. This 
includes hard to heat homes that have solid walls and/or are off the gas 
network; 
 
• 220,000 households are fuel poor, but do not fit into one of the vulnerable 
categories. These are considered to be a lower priority by the government, 
which has decided to concentrate resources on households with children, older 
people, and disabled persons. But, they would need to be brought into the 
scheme in future years if the objective of eliminating all fuel poverty by 2016 
is to be achieved. Just over a third of this group are receiving one or other of 
the passport benefits and could be incorporated into the scheme relatively 
easily by relaxing the eligibility criteria that currently restricts the scheme to 
households on income-related benefits that contain an older person or child; 
 
• the remaining 650,000 households are vulnerable and fuel poor, but do not 
meet the current eligibility criteria. Just under 100,000 of these households 
contain a younger adult with a long-standing limiting illness or disability, but 
who is not receiving one of the disability-related benefits that would qualify 
them for Warm Front. Most of the remaining households contain someone 
aged 60 or over. Of these, a small number (around 20,000) do not qualify 
because they are not householders - for example older parents living with a 
younger relative. Around 500,000 households are headed by an older person 
and are fuel poor, but do not qualify for the scheme. The majority of these 
(around 60%) are single pensioners and most of them have low incomes - 
three quarters of them are in the bottom fifth of the income distribution and 
their median income is around £135 per week. Some of these households may 
not be claiming means-tested benefits to which they are entitled, but many of 
them will be (just) above the benefit thresholds. The Minimum Income 
Guarantee for a single pensioner in April 2001 was just over £92 per week, so 
someone on this level of income would be fuel poor if their running costs 
exceeded £480 per year. Most of these homes have relatively low energy 
efficiency ratings, although some of those on very low incomes would still be 
fuel poor even if their home had an above average energy efficiency rating. 
Under-occupancy may also contribute to their fuel poverty: 66 per cent of 
these homes were under-occupied according to the government’s own 
definition6 (as compared to 24 per cent of all homes and 37 per cent of all 
older person households).    
 
 
                                                          
6 A home is considered to be under-occupied if the floor area is over twice the minimum set down in 
the Parker-Morris Standard and the number of bedrooms is in excess of the Bedroom Standard. 
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2.4  Non fuel poor and eligible households  
 
From the point of view of resource efficiency, the other problem is the more than two 
million households who qualify for the scheme, but are not fuel poor - around four 
fifths of eligible households, again substantially higher than the figure quoted in the 
NAO report (up to two thirds). These households fall into three distinct groups: 
 
• 640,000 households are eligible for the scheme, but could only receive minor 
measures, such as draught-proofing or energy efficient light bulbs that have 
little impact on energy efficiency ratings, in most cases because they already 
have adequate central heating and insulation. Nevertheless, the NAO 
estimated that around 9 per cent of total grant expenditure in 2001-02 was 
spent on minor measures such as these, many of which will have gone to this 
group of non fuel poor households; 
 
• A further 380,000 non fuel poor households live in homes that are already 
energy efficient (with SAP rating of 60 or more), but would still qualify for 
one or more significant measure under this scheme; 
 
• The remaining 1.3 million households are living in homes that have some 
scope for improvement, but they are not fuel poor because their incomes are 
not very low and/or their home is not very energy inefficient. One in four of 
these households could be classed as ‘near’ fuel poor - defined as needing to 
spend between 7.5 and 10% of their incomes on fuel to heat their home 
adequately and meet their other fuel needs. But, most of these households are 
some way from being fuel poor, though of course their circumstances could 
change over time. This group contains a disproportionate number of 
households with children and those who qualify because they are in receipt of 
one of the (non means-tested) disability benefits.  
 
 
2.5  Other targeting issues 
 
There are a number of additional factors that have implications for the cost-
effectiveness of the scheme beyond the basic targeting issue highlighted in Figure 2.1 
and that are also addressed in this report. 
 
Firstly, the success of a scheme like Warm Front is dependent on the ‘right’ people 
applying for the scheme, as well as getting the eligibility criteria right. In practice, 
scheme managers use various marketing strategies to actively promote the scheme to 
households that are more likely to be in fuel poverty, including targeted mail shots in 
areas that are expected to have a high concentration of fuel poor households and 
‘networking’ with health workers and organisations such as Age Concern, who have 
close contact with the target group. In addition, there may be an element of ‘self-
selection’: for whatever reason, certain types of household may be more or less likely 
to apply for a grant than others. We might, for example, expect that households living 
in the ‘worst’ homes would be more likely to apply, because they have most to gain 
from the scheme. Other factors may also influence the pattern of applications. Private 
sector tenants, who have a relatively high incidence of fuel poverty, may be prevented 
or deterred from applying by the need to obtain their landlord’s consent. Word of 
mouth can be a very effective way of generating applications, but seems to be more 
prevalent in the North than the South (at least for the regions covered by Eaga Ltd). 
For all these kinds of reasons, the effectiveness of Warm Front may differ 
systematically from what would be predicted on the basis of a straight comparison 
between the eligible population and the target population. One of the advantages of 
having administrative data on grant recipients is that we can examine whether certain 
types of eligible household are under or over-represented among grant recipients.  
 
Secondly, the cost-effectiveness of this scheme depends not only on reaching the right 
households, but also on installing the appropriate measures. The cost and impact of 
the measures available under Warm Front will vary substantially from one dwelling to 
the next, depending on a whole range of factors, including the initial energy efficiency 
rating of the home. The simulation model developed in this project (and in previous 
work by the same author) uses estimated heating costs based on the BREDEM-12 
model, which were kindly provided by the Building Research Establishment. This 
allows us to identify where the most cost-effective improvements can be made, taking 
into account the individual characteristics of each dwelling in our data set, although it 
was only possible to consider a restricted set of measures (see Box 4.2 in Chapter 4).  
 
Thirdly, the long-term effectiveness of the scheme may also be affected by 
movements into and out of fuel poverty over time, as already discussed. Some grant 
recipients who are fuel poor when the work is carried out to their home would not 
necessarily remain in fuel poverty (even in the absence of the scheme). They may 
move home and be replaced by a household that is not fuel poor or their own 
circumstances may change; for example, they may experience a rise in income that 
lifts them out of fuel poverty. On the other hand, some households that are not fuel 
poor when they apply for a grant would have become fuel poor as a result of an 
adverse change in their financial circumstances and so the scheme may prevent them 
from experiencing fuel poverty in future years. This issue is examined more fully in 
the final section of this report. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF WARM FRONT RECIPIENTS 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
This section examines the characteristics of Warm Front recipients, using Eaga 
Partnership Ltd’s administrative database, which collects information on all grant 
applicants in the areas of England they cover (North East, North West, West 
Midlands, London, South East and the South West7). The analysis in this report is 
based on data on almost 400,000 households who applied for a grant between April 
2000 and December 2003, including those who received minor measures, such as 
draught-proofing or energy efficient light-bulbs. It excludes social sector tenants, 
because they are no longer eligible and this project is primarily concerned with the 
future targeting of the scheme. It also excludes applicants who did not meet the 
qualifying criteria or who dropped out of the scheme before receiving any measures, 
as well as a small number of repeat observations8.   
 
In order to assess how well the current scheme is targeted, data on Warm Front 
applicants is compared with data on a representative sample of all private sector 
households, using the 2001 English House Condition Survey (EHCS). The better a 
scheme is targeted (in terms of its fuel poverty objective), the more closely the 
characteristics of grant recipients should match those of fuel poor households. So, for 
example, grants should be skewed in favour of single pensioners, who constitute a 
disproportionate share of fuel poor households.  
 
It is also possible to carry out a more detailed analysis of targeting using these two 
data sets. Using the EHCS, we can identify all those households that meet the 
qualifying criteria for Warm Front (i.e. all potential Warm Front applicants), not all of 
whom are equally likely to apply for a grant. This allows two sorts of comparisons to 
be made. First, comparing the characteristics of this group to all private sector 
households shows the impact of the eligibility criteria in restricting access to certain 
types of households. Second, comparing this group of eligible households with actual 
grant recipients (from the Eaga database) shows the impact of other influences on 
applicants, such as the way the scheme is marketed and possible self-selection effects 
(see Figure 3.1 and the earlier discussion in Section 2.5).  
 
 
3.2   Characteristics of grant recipients 
 
The results of this analysis are provided in full in Table A.1 in Annex A and 
summarised below, focusing on the main characteristics that determine how well the 
scheme is targeted. 
7 The other regions (Eastern, East Midlands, and Yorkshire and Humberside) are covered by Powergen 
Ltd.  
8 Some households appear more than once in the original data base if two (or more) measures were 
installed at different points in time. 
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   Figure 3.1: Flow of applications to Warm Front scheme 
 
 
Owner-
occupiers 
and 
private 
sector 
tenants 
 
Eligibility criteria: 
 
*    These households are eligible for larger grants under Warm Front Plus, including new central heating systems. 
**  Formerly the Working Families Tax Credit. An upper income threshold of £14,600 has also been introduced.   
By household type 
Figure 3.2 provides a breakdown of grant recipients by household type and compares 
this with the composition of all private sector households, all Warm Front eligible 
households, and all fuel poor households. Single pensioners stand out as the single 
group most likely to be in fuel poverty; they constitute around one in seven private 
sector households, but over two fifths of all fuel poor households. Although single 
pensioners are more likely to receive a Warm Front grant than other types of 
household, they are still substantially under-represented among fuel poor grant 
recipients in that they receive a smaller share of grants than would be expected on the 
basis of the distribution of fuel poor households.  
 
 
Figure 3.2:  Breakdown by Household Type1,2 
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Source: own analysis using Eaga Partnership Ltd database and 2001 English House Condition Survey. 
1. This Figure shows the composition of each of the four groups (all private sector households, 
Warm Front eligible households, Warm Front grant recipients, and fuel poor households) 
broken down by household type. 
2. Breakdown for grant recipients is based on Eaga database. Other breakdowns are based on the 
2001 EHCS (see notes to Table A.1 in Annex A for more information on these data sources).  
3. Based on the household categories in Eaga’s database, which are slightly different from the 
EHCS categories. These are: single adult (aged under 60); single adult with (dependent) 
children; two adults with (dependent) children; single pensioner (aged 60 or over); two 
pensioners (two adults, one of whom is aged 60 or over); none of these (all other household 
types, including couples without children). See notes to Table A.1 in Annex A for some of the 
problems of classifying households into one of these categories. 
 
 
The qualifying criteria are relatively effective in targeting single pensioners. They are 
by definition “vulnerable” and a relatively high proportion of them are also in receipt 
of one of the qualifying benefits. However, single pensioners that meet the qualifying 
criteria are less likely to apply for a grant than other eligible households; single 
pensioners comprise around a third of all eligible households, but less than a quarter 
of all grant recipients. This suggests that other factors are inhibiting this group from 
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applying (and/or that more single pensioners are pulling out at a later stage in the 
application process). The reasons for this are not well understood, but it could be that 
single pensioners are less likely to hear about the scheme, less likely to value its 
potential benefits, and/ or more likely to be concerned about possible disruption. 
Additional efforts should be made to understand and address these and other possible 
barriers to potential applicants, especially single pensioners. 
 
Single working age adults are also under-represented among grant recipients, though 
for different reasons. Unless they are disabled (and in receipt of a disability-related 
benefit), they are not considered to be vulnerable and do not qualify for a grant, even 
if they are fuel poor. Hence, this group accounts for 12% of fuel poor households, but 
only 4% of Warm Front grants. It has been argued that single working age adults are 
less likely to experience persistent fuel poverty and this was given as a reason for 
excluding this group (DETR, 2001), but the evidence presented in Chapter 5 of this 
report does not support this contention. 
 
By contrast, households with children, including single parent households, are 
substantially over-represented among grant recipients: they receive 36% of all grants, 
but comprise less than 10% of fuel poor households. This is largely because the 
current eligibility criteria discriminate in favour of households with children. Not only 
are they one of the “vulnerable” categories, but the inclusion of child-related tax 
credits as one of the qualifying benefits also extends eligibility to families higher up 
the income scale (though an income ceiling of £14,600 has been introduced to exclude 
those towards the top end of this income range). 
 
By energy efficiency rating 
Occupants of the least energy efficient homes (with a SAP rating of less than 30) 
comprise around a fifth of Warm Front grant recipients, but two fifths of households 
in fuel poverty. Perhaps not surprisingly, eligible households are only slightly more 
likely to be found in low-SAP homes, because the qualifying criteria do not take into 
account the characteristics of the dwelling (though it is perhaps surprising that a group 
containing a high proportion of lower income households is not more heavily 
concentrated in the least energy efficient homes).  
 
Earlier in this report, it was suggested that households living in the least energy 
efficient homes might be more likely to apply for a grant, because they stand to 
benefit most from the measures available under the scheme. Figure 3.3 provides some 
evidence for the existence of such an effect; occupants of homes with a SAP rating of 
less than 30 make up a higher proportion of grant recipients (21%) than of eligible 
households (14%) and vice-versa for occupants of high-SAP dwellings. This self-
selection effect seems to be particularly strong for households without central heating 
(see Table A1). However, there is still a substantial mismatch between the distribution 
of grant recipients and that of fuel poor households, who are more heavily 
concentrated in the least energy efficient homes. This is unlikely to improve unless 
specific mechanisms are put in place to prioritise grants to low-SAP dwellings. Some 
of the options are explored in the next Chapter.  
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Figure 3.3: Breakdown by Initial Energy Efficiency Rating 
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By income group 
As we would expect, the qualifying criteria help to skew grants towards low income 
households, since many of the qualifying benefits are means-tested. Hence, 16% of 
private sector households are in the bottom fifth of the income distribution9, but 36% 
of eligible households are in the lowest income group. However, Figure 3.4 shows 
that the distribution of fuel poor households is even more skewed towards low income 
households – nearly 70% of fuel poor households are in the bottom fifth. 
 
There are several reasons for this. First, not all the qualifying benefits are means-
tested; around a third of grant recipients qualify because they are in receipt of tax 
credits or a non-means-tested disability-related benefit and may be relatively well-
off10. Second, some low income households are receiving one of the means-tested 
benefits, but do not qualify for Warm Front because they are not in one of the 
‘vulnerable’ categories, including working age adults without dependent children. 
Third, the receipt of a means-tested benefit is an imperfect proxy for low household 
income. Some low income households are entitled to a means-tested benefit, but are 
not claiming it, whilst other low income households may be (just) above the income 
thresholds or may fail the assets test11. Alternatively, their household income may be 
boosted by income from other benefit units within the same household - for example 
an older child living at home. 
Figure 3.4: Breakdown by Income Group1,2 
                                                          
9 Income groups are defined across all households, including those in the social rented sector. Private 
sector households have higher incomes, on average, than social sector tenants, hence less than a fifth of 
these households are in the bottom fifth of the income distribution. 
10 Around 40% of these households are in the top half of the income distribution. Some have a 
relatively high income to start with, though in some cases their incomes are inflated by disability-
related benefits; arguably, these should be not be counted as income, because they are designed to 
compensate the recipients for the additional costs of being disabled. 
11 Savings over £8,000 will usually mean that you cannot receive Income Support. If you or your 
partner is aged 60 or over, savings over £12,000 will usually mean you cannot receive the Minimum 
Income Guarantee (replaced by the Pension Credit from October 2003).  
 15
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Bottom quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile Top quintile
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
All private sector h/holds Eligible households Fuel poor h/holds
 
Source: own analysis using Eaga Partnership Ltd database and 2001 English House Condition Survey. 
1. Breakdown for grant recipients is based on Eaga database. Other breakdowns are based on the 
2001 EHCS (see notes to Table A.1 in Annex A for more information on these data sources). 
2. A breakdown by income group is not available for Warm Front recipients as income data is 
not collected in the Eaga Partnership Ltd database. 
 
 
By region 
Households living in the North of England are substantially over-represented among 
grant recipients, whilst households in the South are substantially under-represented. 
Fewer households in the South East and London are in receipt of means-tested 
benefits and so they are less likely to qualify for the scheme. But, even among those 
who do qualify for the scheme, households living in the South are less likely to be 
receiving a grant. Within the areas covered by Eaga Ltd, the North East and North 
West comprise around a third of all eligible households and around a third of fuel 
poor households, but receive over half of all grants (see Figure 3.5).  
 
The NAO report also highlighted this apparent regional imbalance and noted that the 
number of grants to London and the South East had fallen significantly short of their 
area targets (NAO, 2003, p18). This is not so much of a concern in terms of the 
government’s fuel poverty objective. Among households who are eligible for Warm 
Front grants, there is little variation in the rate of fuel poverty between regions (i.e. 
the targeting of the scheme would not be significantly better or worse if grants were 
distributed more evenly between regions). But, it does raise concerns about equity in 
that fuel poor households in the South of England are less likely to benefit from the 
scheme than fuel poor households in the North. 
 
Eaga Ltd have put forward various explanations for these regional differences, 
including differences in the composition of the housing stock - the preponderance of 
flats in London may make many of these properties less amenable to energy 
efficiency improvements. Cultural differences may also be a factor: more than a 
quarter of Warm Front recipients say they heard about the scheme from a friend, 
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family, or neighbour and this kind of ‘word of mouth’ publicity may be more 
effective in the North. Another reason is that the regional targets originally set for 
Warm Front were apparently based on a misrepresentation of the geographical 
distribution of fuel poverty.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Breakdown by Region1 
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Source: own analysis using Eaga Partnership Ltd database and 2001 English House Condition Survey. 
1. Breakdown for grant recipients is based on Eaga database. Other breakdowns are based on the 
2001 EHCS (see notes to Table A.1 in Annex A for more information on these data sources). 
 
 
Overall targeting of scheme 
As already noted, if the scheme is well-targeted, we would expect the characteristics 
of grant recipients and fuel poor households to be closely matched. Although grant 
recipients are more similar to fuel poor households than other private sector 
households, those groups who are most likely to be fuel poor are substantially under-
represented among Warm Front recipients, including single pensioners, households on 
low incomes, and occupants of low-SAP dwellings. There also appears to be a 
regional imbalance in the distribution of grants, which raises concerns about equity. 
 
This may, however, give a slightly misleading impression, because it does not allow 
for the variation in the size of grants between different types of household. Pensioner 
households are entitled to larger grants than other households (including new central 
heating systems), whilst grants to low-SAP dwellings are higher than average, 
because it is less likely that they will already have the various measures available 
under Warm Front. Table A2 (also in Annex A) shows the distribution of non-minor 
grants and of total grant expenditure. This shows, for example, that 31% of total grant 
expenditure went on single pensioners (compared with 23% of all grants).  
 
 
3.3  Changes in characteristics of Warm Front recipients 
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Table 3.1 shows how the characteristics of grant recipients have been changing over 
time for some of the key categories. There are several worrying trends over this 
period. Those groups that are most likely to be fuel poor - single pensioners, 
households living in low-SAP dwellings, those in receipt of means-tested benefits, 
and those without central heating - are all receiving a lower proportion of grants at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. At the same time, a large and growing share 
of grants – up to 38% in 2003 – were received by households that qualify on account 
of a non means-tested disability-related benefit and a further 21% of grants in that 
year went to households in receipt of the Working Families Tax Credit, few of whom 
will be fuel poor, according to the official definition.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Changes in Characteristics of Warm Front Grant Recipients 
 Referral date: 
% in each sub-category 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
Household type:     
Single adult 4% 4% 5% 4% 
Single adult with children 12% 15% 16% 14% 
Two adults with children 16% 22% 22% 22% 
Single pensioner 29% 23% 21% 20% 
Two pensioners 20% 18% 17% 18% 
Other 18% 19% 19% 21% 
 
Qualifying criteria1:     
60+, means-tested benefit 49% 36% 30% 30% 
Child, means-tested benefit 9% 11% 12% 11% 
Working Families Tax Credit 17% 23% 24% 21% 
Disability-related benefit 25% 30% 34% 38% 
 
Region:     
North East 13% 14% 15% 18% 
North West 33% 35% 38% 36% 
West Midlands 21% 19% 20% 20% 
London 8% 7% 8% 8% 
South East 14% 14% 12% 11% 
South West 11% 10% 7% 7% 
 
SAP rating2:     
Under 30 26% 24% 16% * 
30-50 41% 41% 41% * 
50 and over 33% 35% 43% * 
 
Thermal comfort:     
No central heating 34% 30% 23% 22% 
Non decent home 51% 53% 46% 44% 
     
Source: Own analysis using Eaga database of Warm Front grant recipients (see notes to Table A.1). 
1. See notes to Table A1 for definition of categories. 
2. SAP data is not available for a large number of more recent grant recipients, so figures for 
2003 are unreliable. 
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The Disability Living Allowance was not on the original list of ‘passport’ benefits and 
its subsequent inclusion may explain why the share of grants to disabled households 
appears to have risen over the period covered by this analysis. The way benefit receipt 
is recorded in the Eaga database may also over-state the share of grants to this 
particular sub-group12, although this is less likely to explain the rising share over time. 
Thus, it appears that the scheme is becoming less well targeted over time. The 
regional imbalance noted earlier also seems to be growing over this period. 
 
 
3.4   Fuel poverty among grant recipients 
 
Methodology 
The Eaga database does not collect information on household income, which is 
needed to identify whether grant recipients are fuel poor. However, it is possible to 
impute the income of each household in the Eaga database, using income data from a 
separate dataset, the Family Resources Survey (which is the basis for the 
Government’s official income statistics). Regression imputation is used to estimate 
the household income of each grant recipient as a function of various household 
characteristics that are closely correlated with income, including the type of 
qualifying benefit they are in receipt of, household composition, tenure, size of 
property, and region. The income measure is the same as that used in the official 
definition of fuel poverty - net household income (including housing benefit), before 
housing costs, and unadjusted for differences in household size. Details of the 
imputation process are given in Annex B. 
 
Alongside estimates of required fuel spending13, imputed incomes can be used to 
estimate the proportion of grant recipients who were fuel poor prior to receiving a 
grant. A household is fuel poor if it would need to spend more than 10% of household 
income to heat its home satisfactorily and meet other fuel needs (for lights and 
appliances). In line with the Government’s methodology, estimated running costs 
allow for the fact that some households are more likely to be at home all day and so 
require heating to be on for longer each day. But, unlike the official methodology, 
they do not assume partial heating in under-occupied properties. This may bias the 
estimates of fuel poverty upwards (compared with official measures of fuel poverty), 
particularly for single pensioners and other single person households who are most 
likely to be under-occupying their home. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 Applicants are asked which benefit(s) they are receiving that makes them eligible for Warm Front. 
Surveyors may record more than one qualifying benefit, where applicable, but there is no requirement 
to do so. Where applicants say they are in receipt of one of the qualifying means-tested benefits, they 
are classified into one of the first two categories in Table 3.1 if they also contain an older person or 
dependent child (even if they also report being in receipt of a disability-related benefit). However, Eaga 
Ltd believes that their clients may be less likely to report a means-tested benefit, where they are also 
receiving another qualifying benefit, perhaps because of the possible stigma attached to means-testing. 
If so, this may bias the breakdown of grant recipients by qualifying criteria (although there is no firm 
evidence on this and it is also possible that some clients would not wish to report being in receipt of a 
disability-related benefit for similar reasons). 
13 These were kindly provided by the Energy Audit Company who produced them on behalf of Eaga 
Partnership Ltd. 
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Results 
Overall, our analysis suggests that around 18% of Warm Front recipients to date were 
fuel poor prior to receiving a grant, compared with 8% of all households living in 
England. Thus, grant recipients were more than twice as likely to be fuel poor than 
average. But, most grant recipients - around four in five - were probably not fuel poor.  
 
It is also possible to calculate the incidence of fuel poverty among the sub-sample of 
households in the 2001 English House Condition Survey (EHCS) who meet the 
qualifying criteria for Warm Front. This produces an identical estimate (18%) to the 
one based on Eaga data, which is what we might expect, given what we know about 
the characteristics of grant recipients as compared with all eligible households. On the 
one hand, Warm Front recipients include a more than proportionate number of lower-
SAP dwellings (which would increase the risk of being fuel poor); on the other hand, 
they include a less than proportionate number of single pensioners (which would 
reduce the risk of being fuel poor). Overall, these two effects appear to cancel each 
other out.  
 
Both these estimates are considerably lower than estimates from other sources (see 
Figure 3.6). Estimates by TXU Warm Front Ltd (now Powergen Warm Front Ltd), 
who are responsible for administering Warm Front in the Eastern, East Midlands, and 
Yorkshire and Humberside regions, suggested that 40-50% or more of their grant 
applicants were fuel poor, early evidence from the evaluation of Warm Zone pilot 
project suggested that a third or more of those eligible for Warm Front may not be 
fuel poor (though more recent estimates from individual Warm Zones are much 
lower), and a recent report by the Energy Audit Company (EAC) estimated that 
between 30-44% of grant recipients are fuel poor, excluding single adults and “other” 
households (Wilkinson, Hart, and Hart, 2003).  
 
The EAC figure is also based on the Eaga database, but uses a different method of 
imputing incomes. This discrepancy can largely be accounted for by differences in the 
way incomes are measured. EAC do not include housing benefit or disability benefits, 
so household incomes are lower and, consequently, more households are defined as 
fuel poor. Using a similar income measure to theirs, we get a figure of 29%, excluding 
single adult and “other” households (See Table B2 in Annex B), which is only just 
below the range quoted in their report. There are good arguments for disregarding 
certain sources of income - the Disability Living Allowance, for example, is designed 
to compensate for the additional costs of being disabled and does not make the 
recipient better off than someone who is not disabled and not receiving DLA. For the 
purpose of this report, however, it is important to be consistent with the official 
definition of fuel poverty, which does include these benefits. This analysis shows just 
how sensitive these estimates are to the income measure used.  
 
It is more difficult to reconcile our estimates with others (e.g. in Warm Zones areas), 
because these results are less well documented, although the quality of the income 
data used in some of these studies is rather weak. In evaluating Warm Front and other 
similar schemes, it is it is important that the effects of the scheme are monitored on a 
more consistent basis than in the past, including a more standardised approach to 
defining and measuring incomes.  
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Figure 3.6: Estimates of fuel poverty among Warm Front recipients 
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Source of other estimates: 
Early Warm Zones Pilot estimate: quoted in NAO report (NAO, 2003, p 14). 
TXU estimate: quoted in a presentation by the General Manager of TXU Warm Front Ltd (now 
Powergen Warm Front Ltd) to the Parliamentary Warm Homes Group on 11th December 2002. 
EAC estimate: based on Table on pg 11 of their report (Wilkinson, Hart, and Hart, 2003).  
Hull and Newham Warm Zones estimates: quoted on pgs 8-9 of a report published by the Warm 
Zones Central Team in July 2003, “Warm Zones data analysis: summary and conclusions”. 
 
Table 3.2 provides a more detailed breakdown of our results using both the Eaga 
database and the sub-sample of households in the 2001 EHCS that meet the eligibility 
criteria for Warm Front. This shows, for example, that grant recipients who are not 
fuel poor are more likely to be ‘nearly fuel poor’ than other non fuel poor households, 
although many of them are not. It also shows that the incidence of fuel poverty among 
Warm Front recipients appears to be falling over time. In 2002, it is estimated that 
only 13% of these households were fuel poor, compared with 24% in 2000. These 
figures are adjusted for general rises in incomes over time, so the fall is largely 
explained by the changes in the composition of grant recipients shown in Table 3.1. 
 
The rest of Table 3.2 shows the proportion of households who are fuel poor, broken 
down by various household (or dwelling) characteristics. The breakdown based on the 
Eaga database is very similar to that based on eligible households in the 2001 EHCS, 
which helps to validate these results. Within each sub-group, Warm Front recipients 
are more likely to be fuel poor than other private sector households (the first column). 
This is not surprising given that the scheme is primarily targeted at lower income 
households. So, for example, around 30% of all single pensioners are fuel poor, but 
over 40% of single pensioners who receive a grant are estimated to be in fuel poverty. 
For certain sub-groups of households, the incidence of fuel poverty among grant 
recipients is below the national average (i.e. 8%). This includes households with two 
adults and children, occupants of above-average SAP dwellings, and those who 
qualified because they were in receipt of the Working Families Tax Credit or a 
disability-related benefit. As shown in Table 3.2, these groups receive a very 
substantial and growing share of all Warm Front grants; the latter two categories 
alone account for over half of all grants from 2001 onwards. 
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Table 3.2: Incidence of Fuel Poverty 
Percentage of households 
in fuel poverty 
 
All private  
households1 
(EHCS data) 
Eligible 
households1 
(EHCS data) 
Warm Front  
recipients2 
(Eaga data) 
All  8% 18% 18% 
 
Degree of fuel poverty: 
   
Up to 5% 69% 43% 43% 
5-10% 22% 38% 40% 
10-15% 6% 12% 11% 
Over 15% 3% 6% 6% 
 
Year: 
   
2000 -3 -3 24% 
2001 8% 18% 20% 
2002 -3 -3 13% 
 
Tenure: 
   
Owner-occupier 8% 18% 18% 
Private rented 13% 19% 15% 
 
Household type: 
   
Single adult 9% -4 19% 
Single adult with children 8% 10% 11% 
Two adults with children 1% 5% 5% 
Single pensioner 30-31% 34-35% 43% 
Two pensioners 7-8% 13% 17% 
Other 4-6% 7-16% 5% 
 
Qualifying criteria2: 
   
Not eligible 6% - - 
60+, means-tested benefit7 - 33% 36% 
Child, means-tested benefit7 - 11% 15% 
Working Families Tax Credit - 2% 4% 
Disability-related benefit8 - 9% 7% 
 
 SAP rating: 
   
Under 30 35% 55% 50% 
30-50 10% 22% 14% 
50 and over 3% 6% 5% 
 
Heating system: 
   
Central heating present 32% 44% 36% 
No central heating 7% 15% 12% 
 
Thermal comfort: 
   
Decent home 5% 13%  10% 
Non decent home 17% 30% 27% 
 
Local deprivation: 
   
Worst 20% of wards 10% 17% -5 
Best 20% of wards 6% 17% -5 
1. Own analysis using 2001 English House Condition Survey. 
2. Own estimates using Eaga database and imputed incomes (based on data from the 2000/01 
and 2001/02 Family Resources Survey).  
3. No EHCS data is available for 2000 and 2002 figures have not yet been published. 
4. Too few single (working age) adults are eligible to produce a reliable estimate. 
5. Index of Multiple Deprivation is not available (and cannot easily be derived) within the Warm 
Front data base. 
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It is also notable that eligible households in the poorest 20% of wards (based on the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation) are no more likely to be fuel poor than eligible 
households from the 20% richest wards. Eaga Partnership Ltd carries out targeted 
mail-shots in areas that score highly on local indicators of deprivation. As a result, 
grants are quite heavily skewed towards households living in the poorest wards. This 
might be justified on targeting grounds if eligible households in the poorest areas 
were more likely to be fuel poor than eligible households in other areas, but this does 
not appear to be the case. Area-based marketing may be a cost-effective method of 
generating grant applications, but it does not appear to be an effective instrument for 
targeting fuel poverty. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
 
IMPACT OF WARM FRONT ON FUEL POVERTY 
 
4.1 Approach 
 
Within the context of the fuel poverty strategy, the primary objective of Warm Front 
is to reduce fuel poverty among vulnerable households in the private housing sector. 
The Government’s annual progress report states that energy efficiency schemes, such 
as Warm Front, are expected to have a greater role in achieving further reductions in 
fuel poverty. An important element of this research project is to estimate the impact of 
the current programme to see if these expectations are likely to be met and to provide 
a benchmark for considering the potential benefits of re-designing the scheme.   
 
The estimates in this report are based on a micro-simulation model, using household-
level data from the 2001 English House Condition Survey (EHCS). This section 
describes how this model operates and the assumptions underlying it. For those 
mainly interested in the results (see next section), the key features of the model are 
summarised in Box 4.1.  
 
The EHCS is a large-scale survey of around 17,000 representative households with 
weights that can be used to gross up figures to a national level. The survey contains 
detailed information on each dwelling and its occupants. This can be used to estimate 
how much each household would need to spend to heat their home satisfactorily and, 
using the income data, whether that household is fuel poor and the extent of their fuel 
poverty. This is the same data that is used to generate the government’s published 
estimates of fuel poverty (BRE, 2003). The analysis in this report is based on the sub-
sample of 9,857 dwellings in the owner-occupied and private rented sectors, on the 
basis that Warm Front is no longer available to social sector tenants. 
 
In order to simulate the impact of Warm Front, the Building Research Establishment 
(BRE) provided estimates of required fuel expenditure before and after the installation 
of specified energy efficiency measures for each dwelling in the 2001 EHCS (using 
their BREDEM model). Whilst it was not feasible to replicate the precise set of 
measures available under Warm Front, the BRE were able to model two packages of 
measures that approximate those available under Warm Front and Warm Front Plus. 
The main differences are that the basic package does not include the installation of 
fixed heaters (only insulation measures) and neither package includes minor 
measures, such as draught-proofing or energy efficient light-bulbs (see Box 4.2). On 
the other hand, the BRE estimates may over-estimate the potential savings of new 
central heating systems under Warm Front, because they do not allow for scheme 
restrictions on the number of radiators. A significant minority of homes already have 
all the available measures, so for these households the potential savings (and costs) 
are zero.  
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Box 4.1:  Key features of the micro-simulation model 
 
 
What is the purpose of the model? 
To simulate the impact on fuel poverty of the Warm Front scheme and various proposals for 
redesigning it. 
 
What data is it based on?  
The 2001 English House Condition Survey, which contains a representative sub-sample of 
10,000 households in the owner-occupied and private rented sectors. It includes detailed 
information on the characteristics of each dwelling and its occupants. 
 
How is the impact on fuel poverty measured? 
In two ways:  
(1) the reduction in the number of households in fuel poverty 
(2) the percentage reduction in the fuel poverty gap (which is the difference between 
what fuel poor households can afford to spend and what they would need to spend to 
heat their homes satisfactorily and meet other fuel use requirements).  
Both are measured for private sector vulnerable households only.  
 
What energy efficiency measures are modelled? 
Two packages that approximate as far as possible those available under Warm Front and 
Warm Front Plus (see Box 4.2 for details).  
 
How are the potential fuel savings estimated? 
The Building Research Establishment provided estimates of potential fuel savings for the 
two Warm Front packages for each dwelling in the EHCS, using their BREDEM model. 
 
How are costs estimated? 
The BRE provided dwelling-specific estimates of installation costs. Administrative costs are 
assumed to be £1 for every £5 spent on energy efficiency measures (e.g. £100m out of a 
total programme budget of £600m). 
 
How are grants allocated in the model? 
Grants are distributed randomly between households that meet the qualifying criteria under 
the current scheme until the budget is used up. Alternatives to the current scheme are 
modelled by modifying the eligibility criteria and, in some cases, by imposing additional 
constraints on grant recipients (e.g. a maximum SAP rating).  
 
What are the main limitations of the model? 
(1) The model is static (i.e. the scheme is modelled ‘as if’ all grants were allocated all at 
once). The implications of ‘churn’ are examined in the next Chapter. 
(2) The present model cannot be used to model ‘special’ or differentiated packages of 
energy efficiency measures, only different ways of allocating the two set packages.  
(3) Administrative costs are assumed to be the same for all options, whereas, in practice, 
more targeted options would be more expensive to operate. Hence, the potential 
benefits of these options would need to be weighed against these additional costs. 
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Box 4.2:  Modelled packages 
 
Two improvement packages that are designed to approximate the measures available under 
Warm Front and Warm Front Plus, respectively: 
• Package 1: Basic insulation package including roof insulation, cavity wall 
insulation and cylinder/tank insulation. 
• Package 2: Basic insulation package + standard central heating system. 
 
Description of each measure: 
 
Roof Insulation (P1-P2): If a property has 100mm or less then apply layers of 50mm insulation 
onto original insulation until a layer that is at least 250mm thick is attained. 
 
Cavity Wall Insulation (P1-P2): Any unfilled cavity walls are filled with insulation.  
 
Cylinder Insulation (P1-P2): If there is a hot water tank without a jacket, then a jacket is fitted.  
 
Central Heating (P2): Apply standard gas central heating only to replace individual room heater 
systems of any type.  If there is no sign of gas supply in the property storage radiators will be 
applied. 
 
Water with central heating: Water will be heated by the central boiler if there is central heating.  
 
 
 
A comparison of these estimates with similar estimates produced by the Energy Audit 
Company shows that the potential fuel savings predicted by BRE are substantially 
lower for equivalent measures - by a factor of two or so. These discrepancies need to 
be investigated further, because they clearly lead to widely different conclusions 
about the likely impact of Warm Front on fuel poverty. However, there are two 
reasons for being less concerned about this in the context of this research. First, the 
figures we use are internally consistent; the BREDEM-12 model on which the 
estimates in this report are based is also used to generate the estimates of standardised 
heating costs that feed into the official measure of fuel poverty. Second, even if the 
BRE figures were under-estimates, this should not affect conclusions about the 
relative effectiveness of the different options modelled in this report, which is the 
main purpose of this exercise. 
 
BRE also supplied estimates of the installation costs of the two packages for each 
dwelling in the 2001 EHCS, taking into account which measures were already present 
and the size of the dwelling (e.g. wall area in the case of cavity wall insulation). 
Actual installation costs from the Eaga data base appear to be somewhat lower 
(though less so for packages involving new central heating), perhaps because of 
economies of scale. We make a crude adjustment for this by assuming lower 
administrative costs (see below). 
 
In general, the less energy efficient a dwelling is to start with, the more cost-effective 
it is to improve the energy efficiency of that home, although there is substantial 
variation in cost-effectiveness between individual dwellings (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1: Cost-effectiveness of Energy Efficiency Improvements 
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Source:   
Own analysis using data from the 2001 EHCS and the Building Research Establishment’s BREDEM 
model. Cost-effectiveness ratios are calculated by dividing estimated fuel savings per annum by the 
annualised installation cost of each package of measures. So, a higher ratio indicates a more cost-
effective investment.  (Costs are annualised over 15 years, using an 8 per cent real discount rate.) 
Fitted lines are produced using Stata’s cubic spline option with six bands.    
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The simulation model works as follows. Households are identified as potential grant 
recipients if they meet the scheme’s eligibility criteria. In modelling the current 
scheme, for example, households are eligible if they are receiving one of a specified 
list of disability-related benefits, or if they are receiving one of a list means-tested 
benefits or tax credits and one of the householders is aged 60 or over or has a 
dependent child under 1614. Most of the alternative schemes that are modelled in the 
next section involve restricting eligibility to certain types of households or dwellings. 
Grants are then distributed between eligible households until the budget is used up. 
Under the current scheme, the distribution of grants is done using random assignment, 
which is equivalent to handing out grants on a ‘first-come-first-served’ (assuming that 
every eligible household has an equal probability of applying). Under some of the 
alternative options, various additional constraints are imposed on ‘grant recipients’ 
(e.g. to ensure a given average increase in SAP ratings under the “SAP improvement 
target” option). Reductions in heating costs are then imputed for all grant recipients 
using the estimates provided by BRE (see above) and the extent of fuel poverty is re-
calculated and compared with its baseline (or ‘pre-scheme’) level.  
 
The extent of fuel poverty can be measured in two ways. One approach is to count the 
numbers of households in fuel poverty, which is the most common measure of fuel 
poverty - and the one used by government. Another approach - and the one we focus 
on in this report - is to look at the fuel poverty gap, which also takes into account the 
depth or severity of fuel poverty. The fuel poverty gap is the difference between what 
households can afford to spend - 10 per cent of their annual income, according to the 
official standard - and what they would need to spend each year to heat their home 
satisfactorily, aggregated over all fuel poor households (see Figure 4.2). This measure 
places greater value on assisting a household that is in severe fuel poverty to escape 
fuel poverty (such as household A in Figure 4.2) than on assisting a household that is 
only just below the fuel poverty threshold (such as household B). It also captures 
improvements in the situation of fuel poor households (i.e. reductions in the severity 
of fuel poverty), even if they remain in fuel poverty following improvements in the 
energy efficiency of their home.  
 
Based on the 2001 EHCS, the overall size of the fuel poverty gap among vulnerable 
owner-occupiers and private rented sector households was just over £330m per year. 
This is equivalent to an average shortfall of about £300 per year for each of the 1.2 
million or so vulnerable fuel poor households in the private housing sector. On 
average, these households would need to spend almost £1,000 per year to heat their 
home satisfactorily and meet their other fuel needs, but have an income of £7,000 (i.e. 
it is assumed they could only afford to spend £700 per year on fuel).  
 
The analysis that follows focuses on the percentage reduction in the fuel poverty gap 
as a result of the Warm Front programme. We start by estimating the impact of the 
current scheme and use this as a baseline against which to assess the relative 
effectiveness of various options for redesigning the scheme. 
                                                          
14 The model does not take into account the change made to the eligibility criteria in 2003 whereby 
households in receipt of tax credits are no longer eligible for a grant if their income is above a certain 
threshold – currently £14,200 per year. Nor does it allow for the impact of benefit health-checks on 
offer to applicants who do not initially qualify for a grant (i.e. the fact that some households who are 
eligible for, but are not claiming, one of the passport benefits may become eligible for Warm Front 
following a benefit health-check).   
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Figure 4.2:   Measuring the Fuel Poverty Gap (stylised picture) 
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4.2   Impact of current scheme 
 
To start with, we simulate the impact of Warm Front under the current rules. The 
overall budget is assumed to be £500m, which was the amount allocated to the 
scheme for the four years 2000-2004, less £100m for administration costs i.e. around 
17 per cent of the total. (As noted earlier, this is lower than the actual proportion spent 
on administration - 23 per cent in 2001-0215 - which is a crude adjustment for the fact 
that our estimates of installation costs may be slightly on the high side.) According to 
this model, the current scheme would reduce the numbers of fuel poor households by 
around 60,000 or reduce by 7% the size of the fuel poverty gap among private sector 
vulnerable households (see Table 4.1). Whilst this would represent a significant 
reduction, it is a long way from meeting the government’s target to eliminate fuel 
poverty among vulnerable households by 2010. 
 
There are several reasons why the estimated impact of Warm Front is not greater, 
which have also been identified as problems in the NAO report and in my own 
previous research (Sefton, 2002). Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, only 
around a fifth of grant recipients are likely to be fuel poor, so four out of every five 
grants make no contribution to reducing fuel poverty, at least in the short term 
(although there are still benefits to these households in terms of potential fuel 
savings). At the same time, two thirds of vulnerable fuel poor households are not 
eligible to receive any significant measures under Warm Front, either because they do 
not meet the eligibility criteria or because they already have all the measures available 
under the current scheme. This severely limits the potential impact of the current 
scheme, even if it were expanded or extended over a longer period. 
 
                                                          
15 Figure quoted on p 7 of the National Audit Office’s report on Warm Front (NAO, 2003). 
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Table 4.1: Impact of current scheme  
 
 Baseline:  
current scheme  
% reduction in fuel poverty gap (vulnerable 
h/holds) 
7% 
Reduction in no. of fuel poor h/holds (‘000s) 58 
Number of eligible households (‘000s) 2,010 
Number of HEES grants (‘000s) 842 
% of vulnerable fuel poor households that are 
eligible  
33% 
% of grant recipients who are fuel poor  19% 
% of grant recipients in low SAP homes (<30) 14% 
Average grant (£) 590 
Average annual fuel saving (£) 90 
Cost-effectiveness ratio  1.3 
  
Source: own estimates using EHCS-based micro-simulation model 
 
 
Secondly, the potential fuel savings from the measures available under Warm Front 
are relatively small for many households. On average, grant recipients stand to save 
up to £90 per year. These savings are higher for fuel poor grant recipients – nearly 
£200 per year, on average, according to the estimates provided by the BRE. But these 
benefits are concentrated on a relatively small proportion of fuel poor households. 
Half these households stand to benefit by less than £100 per year and a quarter of 
them stand to benefit by less than £50 per year. This compares with an average fuel 
poverty gap of £300 per year, which explains why in this model the majority of fuel 
poor households that receive a grant are still in fuel poverty after the installation of 
Warm Front measures. An estimated 104,000 out of 166,000 (over 60%) would not be 
lifted out of fuel poverty, although the severity of their fuel poverty would be reduced. 
Independent analysis of the Stockton Warm Zone found that a very similar proportion 
of fuel poor households - between 50 and 60 per cent - would not be removed from 
fuel poverty following Warm Front-type interventions16.  
 
 
4.3  Options for redesigning Warm Front 
 
Many recommendations have been made for improving the effectiveness of Warm 
Front. The options considered in this report are drawn from the NAO report and from 
the proceedings of a discussion forum organised in November 2003 by Defra and the 
Energy Efficiency Partnership for Homes to consider the future of Warm Front. A list 
of these options is provided in Table 4.2. Not all these options are modelled in this 
report, either because they were not considered to be ‘serious’ options (e.g. co-
funding of grants) or because of the constraints of this model (e.g. the more 
differentiated packages of measures). Other options can only be modelled 
imperfectly: for example, targeted marketing strategies can only be modelled by 
increasing the proportion of grants to the targeted groups on the assumption that the 
policy is successful.  
                                                          
 16 Figure quoted in e-mail correspondence with Nick Merleau-Ponty at the NEA. 
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Table 4.2: Options for Re-designing Warm Front 
 
 
  
 Modelled? 
Eligible groups:  
• Include all pensioners, not just those in receipt of one of the qualifying 
benefits; 
D 
• Exclude those who only qualify because they are receiving a (non 
means-tested) disability-related benefit; 
D 
• Add health criteria (i.e. prioritising those with health problems that 
make them vulnerable to the effects of living in poorly heated homes); 
U 
• Quotas for grants to different types of household or property (e.g. at 
least X% of grants to pensioners) 
D 
  
Prioritising less energy efficient homes:  
• High SAP threshold (say 50 or 60) to exclude those in relatively 
energy efficient homes; 
D 
• Low SAP threshold (say 20 or 30) to target those in the very worst 
homes; 
D 
• Target for average improvement in SAP rating to give scheme 
managers a greater incentive to target those in low SAP homes (where 
large SAP improvements are generally easier to achieve); 
D 
• Exclude dwellings that already meet the thermal comfort criterion of 
the Decent Homes standard. 
D 
  
Differentiated scheme:  
• Special package of measures for hard-to-heat homes (e.g. oil-based 
central heating for those without cavity walls and off the gas network); 
U 
• Restricting more expensive measures to less energy efficient homes 
with fewer measures for more energy efficient homes; 
U 
• Co-funding: partial grants depending on client’s circumstances – from, 
say 25%, for higher income households in relatively energy efficient 
homes, up to 100% for low income households in the least energy 
efficient homes; 
U 
  
More generous package of measures:  
• ‘Gold-star’ service: installing all appropriate and cost-effective 
measures for those households that qualify; 
U 
• Central heating for all those without central heating; D 
• Removing grant maxima; U 
  
Marketing strategy:  
• Targeted marketing strategies to increase applications from specific 
groups (e.g. those living in rural areas) and/or offering financial 
incentives to encourage referrals (e.g. from GPs); 
(D) 
• Taking steps to reduce drop-out rate among applicants (e.g. better 
training of surveyors on how to handle clients’ concerns); 
U 
  
Increased resources:  
• Increase the scheme’s budget. D 
 
 
 
 
One of the limitations of this model is that the administrative costs are assumed to be 
the same for all these options, whereas in practice those options that involve a more 
complex system of allocating grants would be more expensive to administer. In 
general, there is a trade-off between improved targeting and higher administrative 
costs. What the analysis in this report helps to do is to quantify the potential benefits 
of better targeting, which can then be weighed against the additional administrative 
costs of a revised scheme, as well as other ‘political’ or pragmatic considerations. 
These options are discussed in turn and the key results are then summarised towards 
the end of this Chapter.    
 
Eligible groups  
Changing the qualifying criteria is the most obvious way to improve the match 
between eligibility and fuel poverty. Expanding the eligibility criteria would help to 
cover the many fuel poor households that are not eligible for Warm Front under the 
current rules. As discussed earlier, most of this group are pensioners, so one option 
would be to include all households with someone aged over 60 (not just those in 
receipt of certain passport benefits), as is already the case in Scotland. 
 
Conversely, restricting the eligibility criteria would help to reduce the number of non 
fuel poor households that are eligible for the scheme. These are mostly households 
who qualify because they are receiving child-related tax credits or non-means-tested 
disability benefits. We, therefore, examine the impact of concentrating eligibility only 
on those groups on low incomes as shown by receipt of means tested benefits, as 
proposed in the NAO report.  
 
Table 4.3 shows that changing the eligibility criteria on its own would have relatively 
little impact on the overall effectiveness of Warm Front. Including all over 60s in the 
scheme on its own would marginally reduce the cost-effectiveness of the scheme, 
because it would open the scheme to many higher income pensioners who are not fuel 
poor, though it would dramatically improve the coverage of the scheme - around two 
thirds of vulnerable fuel poor households would be eligible for the scheme (up from 
one third under the current scheme). Restricting eligibility only to those in receipt of a 
means-tested benefit would marginally improve the cost-effectiveness of the scheme, 
by excluding many non fuel poor households with only a small reduction in coverage. 
 
SAP threshold 
As the costs and benefits of Warm Front measures vary significantly between 
dwellings, there is scope to increase the efficiency of the programme by directing 
grants at homes where the improvements would be most cost-effective (i.e. with the 
greatest potential fuel savings per pound spent). As already noted, improvements are 
generally more cost-effective for less energy efficient homes, so one way to achieve 
this would be to focus resources on low SAP homes. The occupants of low SAP 
homes are also more likely to be in fuel poverty, so targeting would be improved, too.   
 
The options considered here involve the introduction of a SAP threshold. Applicants 
would have an initial assessment of their home and those with a SAP rating above a 
certain level would be excluded from the scheme (or would only be eligible for very 
low cost measures, such as energy efficient light bulbs). 
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Table 4.3: Impact of Changing Eligibility Criteria  
 Baseline: 
current 
scheme 
 
 
(1) 
(1) plus 
 all over 
60s 
 
 
(2) 
(1) plus 
exclude 
disabled 
and WFTC 
claimants 
  (3) 
% reduction in fuel poverty gap 
(vulnerable h/holds) 
7% 6% 9% 
Reduction in number of fuel poor h/holds 
(‘000s) 
58 54 72 
Number of eligible households (‘000s) 2,010 4,630 1,300 
Number of HEES grants (‘000s) 840 760 740 
% of vulnerable fuel poor households that are 
eligible 
33% 67% 30% 
% of grant recipients who are fuel poor 19% 18% 27% 
% of grant recipients in low SAP homes (<30) 14% 14% 17% 
Average cost of improvements (£) 590 660 680 
Average annual fuel savings (£) 90 100 100 
Cost-effectiveness ratio  1.3 1.3 1.3 
    
Source: own estimates using EHCS-based micro-simulation model 
 
 
 
Table 4.4: Impact of SAP threshold  
 Baseline: 
current 
scheme 
Current 
eligibility 
criteria,  
plus SAP 
threshold of: 
Restricted 
eligibility 
criteria*,  
plus SAP 
threshold of: 
  60 50 60 50 
Expanded 
eligibility 
criteria, plus 
SAP 
threshold of 
30** 
% reduction in fuel poverty gap 
(vulnerable h/holds) 
7% 9% 11% 11% 14% 19% 
Reduction in number of fuel poor 
h/holds (‘000s) 
58 69 82 88 99 100 
No. of eligible households (‘000s) 2,010 1,620 1,090 1,040 725 650 
Number of HEES grants (‘000s) 840 780 710 700 617 450 
% of vulnerable fuel poor 
households that are eligible 
33% 33% 29% 29% 26% 29% 
% of grant recipients who are fuel 
poor 
19% 24% 30% 32% 42% 53% 
% of grant recipients in low SAP 
homes (<30) 
14% 18% 26% 20% 29% 100% 
Average cost of improvements (£) 590 640 700 710 810 1,100 
Average annual fuel savings (£) 90 110 130 120 150 290 
Cost-effectiveness ratio  1.3 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.6 2.3 
       
* Excluding those who qualify because they are in receipt of disability-related benefits or tax credits. 
** All over 60s included in Warm Front Plus. 
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If the current eligibility criteria are unchanged and the SAP threshold is set too low, 
then the scheme would soon run out of potential grant recipients. So, a very low SAP 
threshold only works if the existing eligibility criteria are extended, so that a large 
enough pool of potential applicants is available from which to select those who are 
living in the least energy efficient homes. For the purposes of this analysis, it is 
assumed that all over 60s are made eligible for Warm Front alongside the introduction 
of the very low SAP threshold of 30 or less. However, when the SAP threshold is set 
at a much higher level (at 50 or 60), it would be possible to combine this with more 
restricted eligibility criteria along the lines of the final option considered in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the estimated impact of introducing a SAP threshold at different 
levels. If the current eligibility criteria are unchanged, setting the threshold at a high 
level to reduce spending on dwellings that are already energy efficient has a small 
positive effect on the scheme’s effectiveness, by excluding a group of potential 
applicants who are unlikely to be fuel poor. If, in addition, the eligibility criteria were 
tightened to include only those in receipt of a means-tested benefit, then the combined 
impact is greater still - a reduction of between 11-14% in the fuel poverty gap. 
 
The potential benefits of a much lower threshold are even more substantial. With a 
SAP threshold of 30, the fuel poverty gap could be reduced by close to 20%, 
compared with 7% under the current scheme. Although the average size of grants 
would be substantially larger (because these homes are in greater need of 
improvement), the potential fuel savings more than justify the additional cost. On 
average, each £1 of investment (annualised over time) generates more than £2 per 
annum in potential fuel savings. Furthermore, over half these households would be 
fuel poor, compared to around a fifth of current Warm Front applicants. The main 
limitation of some of these proposals, other than the extra administrative costs, is that 
they would require quite a high response rate from households in lower SAP homes; 
for example, in the case of a SAP threshold of 30, around 70% of eligible households 
would need to apply with this size of programme, which is towards the limits of what 
is feasible however intensively the scheme is marketed. (Warm Zones have achieved 
around 80% coverage within their boundaries.) 
 
Other proposals 
Table 4.5 shows the estimated impact of various other options for redesigning Warm 
Front, compared with the current scheme. The first of these proposals involves 
extending Warm Front Plus to all eligible households, whereas at present new central 
heating systems are only available to older person households. There is no additional 
impact on fuel poverty, indeed a very slight fall. The main difference is that fewer 
larger grants are handed out. There are some clear ‘winners’: households without 
central heating who were previously only eligible for the more restricted package of 
measures. But, overall, the cost-effectiveness of these measures is slightly worse and 
recipients are only slightly more likely to be fuel poor. 
 
The second proposal is an existing policy to increase the proportion of grants going to 
older person households (containing someone aged over 60 or over). For 2001/02, a 
target was set at 61%, which is around 10 percentage points higher than under the 
baseline scheme. If this target were achieved over the length of the programme, this 
option would lead to a very slight improvement in cost-effectiveness, because the 
targeted group is more likely to be in fuel poverty. 
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Table 4.5: Impact of other proposals  
 Baseline: 
current 
scheme 
 
(1) 
Warm 
Front 
plus for 
all 
(2) 
Grant 
quota/ 
target for 
over 60s 
(3) 
Average 
SAP 
target of 
15 
(4) 
Non-
decent 
homes 
only 
(5) 
Fuel 
poverty 
‘check’* 
 
(6) 
% reduction in fuel poverty gap 
(vulnerable h/holds) 
7% 7% 8% 12% 11% 24% 
Reduction in number of fuel poor 
h/holds (‘000s) 
58 53 67 78 67 209 
Number of eligible households 
(‘000s) 
2,010 2,070 2,010 2,010 830 780 
Number of HEES grants (‘000s) 840 670 820 590 630 520 
% of vulnerable fuel poor households 
that are eligible 
33% 35% 33% 33% 21% 67% 
% of grant recipients who are fuel 
poor 
19% 20% 21% 27% 30% 100% 
% of grant recipients in low SAP 
homes (<30) 
14% 15% 14% 23% 32% 44% 
Average cost of improvements (£) 590 750 620 860 790 970 
Average annual fuel cost saving (£) 90 110 90 160 140 200 
Cost-effectiveness ratio  1.3 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.8 
       
Source: own estimates using EHCS-based micro-simulation model 
* Plus expanded eligibility (all over 60s included). 
 
 
The third option is to set an average SAP improvement target. Scheme managers 
would need to show that, on average, the measures installed had increased energy 
efficiency by at least a certain number of SAP points - in this example, 15, which is 
around double the average achieved under the current scheme17. Large SAP 
improvements are easier to achieve for low SAP dwellings, so this option would 
encourage scheme managers to target the least energy efficient homes without the 
need to impose an absolute SAP threshold. It would also focus investment on the most 
cost-effective improvements. The results are reasonably encouraging: assuming the 
target was achieved, it would reduce the fuel poverty gap by 12%, compared with 7% 
under the baseline scheme. A greater share of grant expenditure would be on very low 
SAP dwellings, so the cost-effectiveness of these measures would be greater and the 
occupants would be more likely to be in fuel poverty.  However, this leaves open the 
mechanism(s) that would be used to achieve this target and whether the target could 
be sufficiently ambitious without significantly altering the operating ‘norms’ of the 
current scheme. 
 
The fourth option would restrict grants to those living in dwellings that fail the Decent 
Homes standard on the thermal comfort criteria (as a crude proxy for less energy 
efficient homes). This would link the scheme with the Government’s housing agenda, 
                                                          
17 According to estimates based on BRE data, the average improvement in SAP ratings following Warm 
Front was about 7.5 (only counting significant measures). According to Eaga Ltd (and using a different 
model), the average SAP improvement is around 13. The appropriate level at which to set a SAP 
improvement target would clearly depend on how SAP improvements were estimated (e.g. it would 
need to be higher than 15 if Eaga’s current methodology were employed), but the basic principle would 
be the same.   
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as well as helping to direct grants towards the least energy efficient homes. Again, the 
predicted impact is a non-trivial increase in the scheme’s effectiveness - an 11% cut in 
the fuel poverty gap - which would need to be weighed against the extra 
administrative complexity of such a scheme.   
 
The final option considered here would involve an initial assessment of whether the 
applicant was fuel poor, based on their household income as well as the characteristics 
of their home. Only households identified as being fuel poor would receive a grant. 
Leaving aside the difficulties of implementing this proposal, the potential benefits are 
considerable – a reduction in the fuel poverty gap of up to 24% (though less in 
practice, because the assessment would not be completely accurate).  
 
Expanded scheme 
All the options modelled so far have assumed a fixed budget of £500 million, which is 
approximately the amount allocated to Warm Front up to and including 2004/05. 
Clearly, one way to increase the impact of the programme is to increase its budget or 
extend it over a longer period18. In their most recent report, the Government’s Fuel 
Poverty Advisory Group (FPAG) recommended a 50% increase in the Warm Front 
budget to help meet the government’s targets. The government’s own analysis 
estimated that between £1.5-1.9 billion would need to be spent on private housing to 
remove all vulnerable households from fuel poverty, although it recognised that more 
money would be needed in practice to allow for imperfect targeting and to help those 
households who would not be removed from fuel poverty by the measures proposed 
(FPAG, 2003).    
 
Table 4.6 examines the potential impact of expanding the budget both under the 
current rules and with a SAP threshold. In the latter case, the SAP threshold is higher, 
the larger the programme is, in order to ensure a large enough pool of potential 
applicants. If the existing scheme were doubled in size (or extended at current levels 
of funding for a further four years), the fuel poverty gap would be cut by an estimated 
15% (i.e. around double the impact of the current programme). At this point, most of 
those currently eligible for the scheme would have received a grant in our static 
model, so the scheme would have reached a natural limit (though, in practice, the pool 
of potential applicants is added to each year, as people turn 60 and/or start receiving 
one of the qualifying benefits).  
 
With a SAP threshold, the impact of an expanded programme is greater for the 
reasons already discussed: grants are targeted at less energy efficient dwellings where 
improvements are generally more cost-effective and the occupants are more likely to 
be fuel poor. As the programme expands, though, the additional benefit of any further 
investment begins to fall. This is a classic case of diminishing marginal returns: as the 
number of fuel poor households is cut, so the additional (or marginal) cost of lifting 
the remaining households out of fuel poverty will tend to rise. A smaller programme 
can be more narrowly targeted at the very lowest SAP homes, where the benefits are 
greatest. With a larger programme (and a higher SAP threshold), more grants end up 
going to households that are not fuel poor, though coverage is improved.  
 
 
                                                          
18 This is a static model, so the predicted impact of, say, doubling the budget will be the same as the 
impact of extending the current programme over another four years. 
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Table 4.6: Impact of expanded programme  
 Current scheme Expanded programme*  
(with variable SAP threshold) 
 500 1,000 1,000 
(SAP<40) 
1,500 
(SAP<45) 
2,000 
(SAP<50) 
Total installation costs (£m) 500 1,000 1,000 1,500 2,000 
% reduction in fuel poverty gap 
(vulnerable h/holds) 
7% 15% 25% 32% 35% 
Reduction in number of fuel poor 
h/holds (‘000s) 
58 119 170 237 282 
Number of eligible households (‘000s) 2,010 2,010 1,270 1,830 2,590 
Number of HEES grants (‘000s) 840 1,660 1,060 1,760 2,590 
% of vulnerable fuel poor households 
that are eligible 
33% 33% 42% 51% 59% 
% of grant recipients who are fuel poor  19% 19% 39% 33% 26% 
% of grant recipients in low SAP homes 
(<30) 
14% 15% 50% 35% 25% 
Average cost of improvements (£) 590 600 940 850 770 
Average annual fuel cost saving (£) 90 90 200 170 150 
Cost-effectiveness ratio  1.3 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 
      
Source: own estimates using EHCS-based micro-simulation model 
* Expanded eligibility (all over 60s included). 
 
 
However large the programme, there is a limit to what can be achieved through the 
energy efficiency measures available under the current scheme. Even if every 
vulnerable fuel poor household in the private sector were to receive all the measures 
available under Warm Front (including new central heating systems for those 
currently without central heating), there would still be substantial levels of ‘residual’ 
fuel poverty. According to our model, the maximum achievable reduction in the fuel 
poverty gap would be around 40%19 (or nearly a one third reduction in the numbers of 
vulnerable households in fuel poverty). To reduce fuel poverty beyond this point (at 
2001 income levels), additional measures would be needed to assist those fuel poor 
households for whom current Warm Front measures are insufficient - and even then it 
would not be possible to completely eliminate fuel poverty among very low income 
households. However, some of these measures are not generally very cost-effective – 
for example, internal insulation in homes that have solid walls - which is why they are 
not currently on offer. 
 
 
4.3   Summary 
 
This chapter uses a micro-simulation model to quantify the impact of Warm Front on 
fuel poverty. The results suggest that the current programme covering the period from 
2000 to 2004 should contribute to a small, but significant, reduction in the fuel 
poverty gap (of around 7%) and in the numbers of vulnerable fuel poor households (of 
around 60,000). To help put this into context, this is equivalent to the effect of a 
general rise in incomes of 3.5% or a fall in energy prices of 2.5% (both in real terms).  
                                                          
19 If all vulnerable fuel poor households were to receive all the measures available under Warm Front, 
including new gas central heating systems for those without central heating.  
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The effectiveness of various options for redesigning the scheme are summarised in 
Figure 4.3 in terms of their impact on the fuel poverty gap.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Impact of various options for redesigning Warm Front 
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Source: own estimates using EHCS-based micro-simulation model 
* Only covering those who are in receipt of a means-tested benefit. 
** Set at about twice the average improvement in SAP ratings under the current scheme to date. 
*** All over 60s included in Warm Front Plus. 
 
 
Only small improvements in the scheme’s effectiveness would be achieved by 
tightening the eligibility criteria (by excluding households not in receipt of a means-
tested benefit) OR by excluding those living in homes that are already energy 
efficient. Combining these two measures would have a more substantive effect. Of the 
other less radical options considered in this report, the most promising would be to 
exclude dwellings that meet the Decent Homes standard or to introduce an average 
SAP improvement target, giving scheme managers an incentive to target lower SAP 
dwellings. These would have broadly the same impact on fuel poverty - a reduction of 
between 11-12% - though in different ways.  
 
But, to make a more substantial difference, more radical changes are needed, such as 
the introduction of a much lower SAP threshold (in the order of 30) or a fuel poverty 
‘check’ to ensure that grants are only allocated to households that are identified as 
being fuel poor. Both these proposals would increase the scheme’s effectiveness by a 
factor of three or so, though they would also add to its administrative complexity and 
cost.  
 
Expanding the budget would also increase the scheme’s impact on fuel poverty, but 
there are limits to what can be achieved through the energy efficiency measures alone. 
More than half the fuel poverty gap would remain even if every vulnerable fuel poor 
household in the private sector were to receive all the measures currently available 
under Warm Front. 
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4.4   Sensitivity analysis 
 
The preceding analysis assumes there is no benefit in assisting households that are not 
fuel poor, even if they are only just above the official fuel poverty threshold. 
Although this is a reasonable, if strict, interpretation of the government’s fuel poverty 
objectives, the precise definition of fuel poverty is somewhat arbitrary. There is no 
good reason why, for example, we should be concerned about households who would 
need to spend 10.5% of their income to heat their homes satisfactorily and meet other 
fuel needs, but have no concern for those who would need to spend 9.5%. It would 
perhaps be more reasonable for our level of concern to be graduated; so, we might 
give some weight to assisting those who are close to being fuel poor, though more to 
those who are fuel poor, particularly those who are severely fuel poor. 
 
For the purposes of this report, this only matters if it affects the relative effectiveness 
of the different options. One way of testing this is to see how sensitive the results are 
to changing the fuel poverty line. The simulation model is re-run under two 
alternative definitions of fuel poverty: a 7.5% threshold, which recognises the value of 
assisting those who are “near fuel poor” and a 12.5% threshold, which focuses on 
assisting those in more severe fuel poverty. The results of this sensitivity analysis do 
not substantively alter our earlier findings (see Figure 4.4). With a fuel poverty 
threshold of 7.5%, the fuel poverty gap is larger, hence the scheme’s impact is smaller 
in percentage terms (and vice-versa for a higher fuel poverty threshold). But, the 
ranking of different options is the same wherever the fuel poverty line is set. The only 
difference is that the more targeted options, such as the SAP threshold of 30, are 
marginally more attractive (relative to the current scheme) with a higher fuel poverty 
line and marginally less attractive with a lower fuel poverty line. This is not 
surprising: a more targeted scheme will be most advantageous if the focus is on 
helping the severely fuel poor. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Sensitivity of results to changes in the fuel poverty threshold 
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Source: own estimates using EHCS-based micro-simulation model 
* Only covering those who are in receipt of a means-tested benefit. 
** Set at about twice the average improvement in SAP ratings under the current scheme. 
*** All over 60s included in Warm Front Plus. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
 
DYNAMICS OF FUEL POVERTY 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
Until fairly recently, policy documents on fuel poverty have largely ignored the 
dynamics of fuel poverty, even though previous research suggests that there is 
considerable movement of households into and out of fuel poverty (Sefton, 2002). 
This has important policy implications, because there is a strong case for targeting 
those households who are likely to be in persistent fuel poverty. Firstly, fuel poverty 
is arguably less of a concern for households that are only temporarily fuel poor; any 
health risks, for example, might be expected to accumulate over time. Secondly, the 
long-term cost-effectiveness of the programme will be greater if expenditure is 
concentrated on  households, who are not only fuel poor now, but are likely to remain 
fuel poor for longer (in the absence of energy efficiency improvements). This report 
provides a more detailed analysis of fuel poverty dynamics using data from two 
separate surveys: the English House Condition Survey (EHCS) and the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  
 
 
5.2   Analysis using the EHCS 
 
Movements into and out of fuel poverty are first analysed using the longitudinal 
sample of the 1991 and 1996 English House Condition Surveys. We did not have a 
consistent measure of standardised fuel expenditure for the more recent longitudinal 
sample (i.e. 1996 and 2001), so it was not possible to update this part of the analysis. 
However, the broad conclusions are still likely to hold; indeed, the period 1991-96 is 
probably more representative than the more recent period, when energy prices have 
fallen sharply. We have data on around 2,600 dwellings that were surveyed in 1991 
and re-surveyed in 1996, as well as information on their occupants at both points in 
time. The analysis in this section covers all tenures, including the social rented sector. 
 
Around 28% of households were fuel poor in 1991, falling to 26% in 1996. Of those 
dwellings that were occupied by a fuel poor household in 1991, 57% were still 
occupied by a fuel poor household five years later. At the same time, around 12% of 
dwellings that did not contain a fuel poor household in 1991 were occupied by one 
five years later. Fuel poverty is, therefore, a moving target. Furthermore, these flows 
into and out of fuel poverty are not driven by small upward or downward movements 
across the 10% threshold. Many households who escape fuel poverty move well 
below the threshold and vice-versa (see Table A.3 in Annex A).  
 
Figure 5.1 shows that the amount of movement out of fuel poverty varies significantly 
between different types of household. Not only are couples with children less likely to 
be fuel poor but, if they are fuel poor, the occupants are less likely than other types of 
household to remain in fuel poverty over a five year period - in just over a third of 
cases between 1991-96. Single pensioners are the most likely to experience persistent 
fuel poverty: three quarters of single pensioners who were fuel poor in 1991 were still 
in fuel poverty after five years. Persistent fuel poverty is also higher than average 
among low income households and occupants of low-SAP dwellings.  
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Figure 5.1: Rates of persistent fuel poverty by type of household 
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SAP >50
Persistent fuel poverty (% of households remaining fuel poor after five years)
 
Source: own analysis using longitudinal sample of the 1996 and 2001 English House Condition Survey 
* Low income is defined as being in the bottom fifth of net household incomes. 
 
 
 
Table A.4 (in Annex A) also shows entry rates into fuel poverty (i.e. the proportion of 
dwellings occupied by a fuel poor household in 1996 that were not occupied by one 
five years previously). Entry rates are highest among pensioner households, single 
parent households, low income households, and low-SAP dwellings. These are 
broadly the same groups that are most likely to experience persistent fuel poverty. If 
they are already fuel poor, they are more likely to remain fuel poor and if they are not 
fuel poor, they are more vulnerable to falling into fuel poverty.  
 
The occupants of a dwelling can move out of or into fuel poverty either because of a 
change in their income or a change in their required fuel expenditure, or some 
combination of the two. A change in the income of the occupants may come about 
either because of a change in the financial circumstances of the occupants or because 
the original occupants move home and are replaced by a different household. Table 
5.1 shows that changes in income accounted for the majority - around two thirds - of 
all movements into and out of fuel poverty between 1991 and 1996. There was a fall 
in real fuel prices over this period, which is why changes in required fuel expenditure 
account for a greater proportion of exits from fuel poverty than entries into fuel 
poverty. 
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Table 5.1: Reasons for movements into and out of fuel poverty 
 Exits from 
fuel poverty 
Entries into 
fuel poverty 
All movements 
into and out of 
fuel poverty 
Rise or fall in income1  59% 71% 64% 
Fall or rise in required fuel spend2  17% 8% 13% 
Both of the above3 11% 7% 9% 
Combination of the above4 13% 15% 13% 
    
Source: Own analysis using longitudinal sample of 1991 and 1996 English House Condition Survey. 
1. Where the change in income is sufficient to move a household out of fuel poverty, but the 
change in required fuel spend is not. 
2.  Where the change in required fuel spend is sufficient to move a household out of fuel 
poverty, but the change in income is not. 
3. Where both the change in income and required fuel spend would be sufficient on their own to 
move a household into or out of fuel poverty. 
4. Where neither the change in income or required spend would be sufficient to move a 
household into or out of fuel poverty, but the two effects combined are sufficient. 
 
 
5.3   Analysis using the BHPS 
 
The British Household Panel Survey is unique in being a longitudinal survey, where 
the same individuals are re-interviewed each year – ten years (or waves) of data were 
available at the time of writing with complete data in all waves for around 5,000 
individuals. Our analysis of BHPS data focuses on households who are spending a 
high proportion of their income on fuel – the “expenditure fuel poor”. This is different 
to the official definition of fuel poverty, which is based on an estimate of required (as 
opposed to actual) fuel expenditure. There is substantial overlap between these two 
definitions of fuel poverty, although some groups, notably single pensioners, make up 
a smaller proportion of the ‘expenditure fuel poor’ than of the official fuel poor, 
whilst single parent households, in particular, are over-represented among the 
expenditure fuel poor (See Annex C). 
 
The advantages of using the BHPS is that it has a larger longitudinal sample and it is 
carried out every year (rather than every five years as was the case for the EHCS20), 
enabling the analysis of year-on-year movements into and out of fuel poverty. It is 
also more up-to-date than the EHCS analysis presented in this report. The other 
difference between the two surveys is that for the EHCS the focus is on the dwelling, 
whereas for the BHPS the focus is on individuals. If an EHCS household moves 
home, the new occupants of the dwelling are interviewed in the follow-up survey, 
whereas if BHPS respondents move home, they are re-surveyed in their new home. 
Consistent data on fuel expenditure is only available since wave 7, so our analysis is 
restricted to waves 7-10, covering the period from 1997/98 to 2000/01.   
 
Using a 10% fuel poverty threshold, around 10% of households and 8% of individuals 
were expenditure fuel poor in 1997/98 - falling to 8% and 5% in 2000/01. (Smaller 
households, in particular single pensioners, are much more likely to be fuel poor, 
hence the difference between the proportion of individuals and households in fuel 
poverty.) But, these are not the same people in each of the four waves. A greater 
proportion of people - 18% of households and 15% of individuals - experienced fuel 
                                                          
20 From 2002 onwards, the English House Condition Survey is carried out on an annual basis. 
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poverty at some point over the four waves (see Table 5.2). At least half these 
households or individuals - 9.0% of households and 8.7% of individuals - experienced 
fuel poverty in only one wave out of the four, whilst 4.3% of households and 2.5% of 
individuals were fuel poor in at least three out of four waves. Thus, for the majority of 
people who experience fuel poverty, it appears to be a transitory phenomenon. 
However, cases of persistent fuel poverty account for a much higher proportion of 
those observed to be fuel poor at any given point in time21 - 44% of fuel poor 
households and 36% of fuel poor individuals. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Persistence of Fuel Poverty in Expenditure Terms1  
  Households: Individuals: 
Fuel poverty 
indicator 
 
 % of cases % of fuel 
poverty 
observations 
% of cases % of fuel 
poverty 
observations 
Proportion fuel poor 
in wave 72 
  
10.3 
 
- 
 
7.8 
 
- 
Number of time fuel 
poor over 4 waves3: 
 
0 
 
82.1 
 
- 
 
85.5 
 
- 
 1 9.0 28.9 8.7 36.9 
 2 4.6 27.2 3.3 26.9 
 3 2.8 25.7 1.7 22.6 
 4 1.5 18.1 0.8 13.6 
      
 At least 
once 
17.9 100.0 14.5 100.0 
 3 or 4 
(persistent) 
4.3 43.9 
 
2.5 36.2 
      
Source: Waves 7-10 of the British Household Panel Survey. 
Based on a sample of 6,242 individuals and 2,571 household heads with complete data on household 
income and fuel expenditure in waves, 7-10. 
1. Households (or individuals within these households) are defined as fuel poor if they are 
spending more than 10% of net household income on fuel. 
2. Wave 7 corresponds to 1997/98. 
3. The four waves included in this analysis are 1997/98 to 2000/01 (inclusive). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that certain types of individual are much more likely to experience 
expenditure fuel poverty. For all these sub-groups, occasional fuel poverty - one or 
two waves out of four - is more prevalent than persistent fuel poverty. However, 
single pensioners and individuals in low income households, in particular, experience 
a relatively high share of persistent fuel poverty compared with other sub-groups. 
Couples with children, on the other hand, are less likely to experience fuel poverty 
and, if they do, it is less likely to be a persistent spell of fuel poverty.  
                                                          
21 A common analogy is that of a hospital ward: most of those who have spell in hospital are short-stay 
patients, but most of the patients in hospital at any given point in time are long-stay patients. 
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Figure 5.2: Experience of expenditure fuel poverty by individual characteristics 
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Source: own analysis using waves 7-10 of the British Household Panel Survey. 
 
 
These results are shown in full in Table A.5 (in Annex A). The final column of this 
Table shows the proportion of fuel poverty observations that are part of a persistent 
experience of fuel poverty i.e. the probability that if a household belonging to one of 
these sub-groups is observed to be expenditure fuel poor at a given point in time that 
this household is experiencing persistent fuel poverty (defined as being in fuel poverty 
for at least three out of the four waves). The majority of single pensioners who are 
observed to be fuel poor at any point in time (56%) are experiencing persistent fuel 
poverty, compared with 44% of all households that are fuel poor, and only 8% of 
couples with children.  
 
Overall, these results are consistent with the results based on the EHCS (see above). 
Together, this evidence strengthens the case for targeting certain types of household, 
in particular single pensioners. 
 
 
5.4   Impact on long-term effectiveness of Warm Front 
 
This final section of this report attempts to incorporate the effects of ‘churn’ into the 
micro-simulation model that we used to predict the impact of Warm Front. So far, this 
modelling has been carried out in static framework, assuming that everything else is 
held constant except for the Warm Front programme; changes in the circumstances of 
the occupants (and changes in the occupants) are effectively ignored. Yet, the 
evidence just presented shows that these changes generate considerable movement 
into and out of fuel poverty over time. Given that the fuel poverty targets are long-run 
ones (e.g. to eliminate fuel poverty among vulnerable households by 2010), it is 
important to consider the implications of ‘churn’.  
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On the one hand, part of the money invested in Warm Front will only have a short-
term impact on fuel poverty, because some of the assisted households would have 
moved out of fuel poverty in any case. On the other hand, some grants may at first 
appear to be ‘wasted’ on non fuel poor households, but may prevent (or reduce) fuel 
poverty at some point in the future due to changes in the occupants’ financial 
circumstances (or changes in the dwelling’s occupants). The net effect is difficult to 
quantify without further modelling (see below).  
 
The model developed here is an adapted version of the one described at the beginning 
of Chapter 4, but using the longitudinal sub-sample of the 2001 EHCS. This consists 
of around 2,000 owner-occupied and private rented dwellings that were surveyed in 
1996 and then re-surveyed in 2001. For these dwellings, we not only have information 
on the current occupants, but also on the occupants five years previously, including 
household type and income. This allows us to examine the impact of changes in 
households’ circumstances over a five year period, assuming that this period is 
reasonably representative of income dynamics over the next five years.  
 
The model operates in the same way as the static model with the following 
differences. Firstly, eligibility for Warm Front (or the proposed variants of the 
scheme) is based on the circumstances of the occupants at the beginning of the five 
year period in 199622, rather than in 2001. Secondly, the initial impact on the fuel 
poverty gap is computed using the income data for occupants in the 1996 survey. 
Thirdly, the impact on the fuel poverty gap is re-computed using the income data for 
the occupants in the 2001 survey.  
 
The key results are presented in Table 5.3. The initial impact (in columns 1 and 2) is 
equivalent to the static model and the results are similar. (We would not expect 
identical results, because the base year is different.) The figures in the first column are 
based on actual incomes in 1996, whilst the figures in the second column are based on 
1996 incomes adjusted upwards in line with the average growth in household incomes 
between 1996 and 2001. This enables us to distinguish the effects of a general rise in 
incomes over time23 from the ‘pure’ effect of churn (i.e. upward and downward 
movements in relative incomes). The third column shows how much lower the fuel 
poverty gap is predicted to be in five years’ time as a result of the measures installed 
at the beginning of the period. In the case of the current scheme, the long-run impact 
is no different from the initial impact, once the effect of general rises in income are 
stripped out. The two effects discussed above - from some households moving out of 
and some households moving into fuel poverty - appear to cancel each other out.  
 
There is some reduction in the effectiveness of the proposed alternatives to the current 
scheme. Schemes that are better targeted in the first place continue to be more 
effective in the longer-term, but some of the benefits of a better targeted scheme are 
diluted over time by the effects of churn. The ‘pure’ effect of churn is relatively small, 
however, both by comparison with the initial impact of these schemes and by 
                                                          
22 The eligibility criteria have had to be simplified to fit the data available in both surveys. Unlike in 
2001, the 1996 EHCS did not ask respondents if they were in receipt of council tax benefit, so 
households who qualify on these grounds alone, including many single pensioners, are not identifiable 
as potential grant recipients. 
23 Some fuel poor households who are assisted by Warm Front would have been lifted out of fuel 
poverty in due course as a result of the general rise in incomes over time.   
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comparison with the effect of the general rise in incomes over time (i.e. the difference 
between columns 1 and 2). 
 
In summary, churn appears to make little difference to the longer-term cost-
effectiveness of Warm Front, as currently designed. And, although it dilutes the 
potential benefits of a better targeted scheme, this effect is relatively small over a five 
year period and could be reduced further by targeting grants at those households most 
likely to be in persistent fuel poverty. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Long run effectiveness of Warm Front  
 
Reduction in fuel poverty 
gap (£m) 
Initial 
impact, 
unadjusted 
incomes1 
(1) 
Initial 
impact, 
adjusted 
incomes2 
(2) 
Long-run 
impact 
after five 
years3 
(3) 
Pure 
‘churn’ 
effect 
 
(3)-(2) 
Current scheme 18 13 13 0 
Revised scheme I: 
(SAP threshold of 50*) 
36 29 28 -1 
Revised scheme II: 
(SAP threshold of 40*) 
55 44 41 -3 
Revised scheme III: 
(SAP threshold of 30*) 
83 70 64 -6 
     
Source: Own estimates based on micro-simulation model using the longitudinal sample of the 1996 and 
2001 English House Condition Survey. 
* Expanded eligibility (all over 60s included). 
1. Impact on fuel poverty gap among occupants in 1996. 
2. As in column (1), but with all 1996 incomes raised in line with the average growth in 
household incomes over the period 1996-2001. 
3. Impact on fuel poverty among occupants in 2001, where grants are allocated on the basis of 
the characteristics of the occupants of each dwelling in 1996 (i.e. five years previously). 
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CHAPTER 6: 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This report examines the targeting of grants under Warm Front and how this could be 
modified in order to have a greater impact on fuel poverty. It focuses in particular on 
the issues raised in the National Audit Office report and on the recommendations of 
that report and other proposals that have arisen during the Government’s review of the 
scheme.    
 
There are broadly two sets of options for increasing the scheme’s contribution to the 
government’s fuel poverty target. The first would produce a modest improvement in 
the scheme’s impact by tightening the eligibility criteria to exclude those groups least 
likely to be in fuel poverty, including those who are not in receipt of a means-tested 
benefit, and by excluding those in homes that are already energy efficient – neither 
change would have much impact on its own. A more flexible alternative (and 
potentially as effective) would be to set an average SAP improvement target to 
encourage scheme managers to skew grants towards those living in the least energy 
efficient homes, although this leaves open the mechanism(s) they would use to meet 
their target and whether this could be done without significantly altering the operating 
‘norms’ of the current scheme. Excluding all homes that already meet the Decent 
Homes standard would have a similar impact on fuel poverty and would tie the 
scheme in neatly with the government’s broader housing agenda.    
 
The second set of options would require more radical changes to the nature of the 
scheme, but with a much larger potential impact on fuel poverty. These options are 
designed to target grants much more narrowly than at present on households at 
greatest risk of being fuel poor, either by restricting grants to only those living in the 
least energy efficient homes (with a SAP rating of 30 or less) or by carrying out a 
prior assessment of each applicant’s dwelling and income (and only allocating grants 
to those identified as being fuel poor). In both cases, the initial eligibility criteria 
would need to be extended, for example to cover all pensioner households, in order to 
generate a large enough pool of potential applicants. The benefits, which are 
potentially very large, would need to be weighed against the additional administrative 
costs, as well as other ‘political’ or pragmatic considerations.   
 
Aside from the eligibility criteria, more still needs to be done to increase the share of 
grants going to single pensioners and, in particular, to understand and overcome any 
barriers that seem to be inhibiting applications from this ‘high risk’ group.  
 
In evaluating the scheme, it is important that the effects of the scheme are monitored 
on a more consistent basis than in the past, based on a more standardised approach to 
defining and measuring incomes (in terms of identifying whether recipients are fuel 
poor) and to estimating potential fuel savings (in terms of identifying whether 
recipients are lifted out of fuel poverty). 
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ANNEX A:  
 
Additional Tables 
 
 
Table A1: Characteristics of Warm Front Grant Recipients 
  Private housing sector only: 
 Percentage 
of all 
h/holds1 
(1) 
Percentage of 
eligible 
h/holds1 
(2) 
Percentage of 
Warm Front 
grants2 
(3) 
Percentage 
of fuel poor 
households1 
(4) 
 
Tenure: 
    
Owner-occupier 88% 82% 90% 81% 
Private rented 12% 18% 10% 19% 
 
Household type: 
    
Single adult 11% 3% 4% 12% 
Single adult with children 5% 18% 14% 5% 
Two adults with children 24% 18% 21% 4% 
Single pensioner4 12-14% 31-34% 23% 43-49% 
Two pensioners4 15-17% 15-17% 18% 13-16% 
Other 29-33% 10-17% 19% 15-24% 
 
Qualifying criteria: 
    
Not eligible 83% - - 63% 
60+, means-tested benefit5,6 7% 40% 35% 27% 
Child, means-tested benefit5,6 4% 24% 11% 5% 
Working Families Tax Credit5 2% 10% 22% <0.5% 
Disability-related benefit5,7 4% 26% 32% 5% 
 
Income group: 
    
Bottom 20% 15% 35% 27%* 79% 
2nd quintile 16% 28% 30%* 16% 
3rd quintile 21% 21% 27%* 4% 
4th quintile 23% 11% 13%* 1% 
Top 20% 24% 5% 3%* 0% 
 
Region: 
    
North East 7% 8% 15% 6% 
North West 19% 25% 36% 23% 
West Midlands 14% 18% 20% 18% 
London 19% 14% 8% 12% 
South East 25% 19% 13% 21% 
South West 15% 16% 9% 19% 
     
Local deprivation8:     
Worst 20% of wards 24% 35% - 28% 
20-40% 22% 25% - 24% 
40-60% 19% 18% - 19% 
60-80% 17% 12% - 16% 
Best 20% of wards 18% 10% - 13% 
     
 51
Table A.1 (contd.): Characteristics of Warm Front Grant Recipients 
 Private housing sector only: 
 Percentage 
of all 
h/holds1,2 
 
(1) 
Percentage of 
eligible 
h/holds1,2,3 
(2) 
 
Percentage of 
Warm Front 
grants 
(3) 
Percentage 
of fuel poor 
households 
(4) 
Size of dwelling:     
1 or 2 bedrooms 31% 39% 33% 37% 
3 bedrooms 48% 50% 59% 44% 
4+ bedrooms 21% 11% 8% 19% 
 
Age of dwelling: 
    
Pre 1900 14% 16% 10% 27% 
1900-1945 29% 30% 52% 35% 
1946-1965 19% 21% 20% 21% 
1966-1980 20% 19% 15% 12% 
Post 1980 18% 13% 4% 5% 
 
Thermal comfort: 
    
No central heating 6% 12% 27% 24% 
Non decent home 25% 33% 48% 52% 
 
SAP rating: 
    
Less than 30 10% 14% 21% 40% 
30-50 39% 37% 41% 44% 
50 or more 52% 49% 38% 16% 
     
Source: Eaga Partnership Ltd database, 2001 English House Condition Survey. 
1. Columns 1,2, and 4 are based on data from the 2001 EHCS. Sample sizes are 9,857 for 
column 1, 1,826 for column 2, and 895 for column 4. These figures are for the whole of 
England, whereas the figures in column 3 are only for regions covered by Eaga Partnership 
Ltd. The results are very similar if the EHCS analysis is repeated for Eaga regions only. 
2. Column 3 is based on data from Eaga’s database of all Warm Front recipients in the areas they 
cover. SAP ratings were provided by the Energy Audit Company. Includes information on 
389,228 households in the private housing sector, who applied to Warm Front between April 
2000 and Dec. 2003. Results are based on non-missing values for each variable. The number 
of missing values is relatively small, except in the case of the SAP variable where ratings have 
not yet been estimated for many more recent grant applicants (29% of all cases)  
3. Based on the household categories in Eaga’s database, which are slightly different from the 
EHCS categories.  
4. The classification of pensioner households in the Eaga database is unclear, so assumptions are 
made in replicating the categories within the EHCS. The lower bound figures only include 
those households containing one person aged 60 or over (“single pensioner”) or couples one 
of whom is aged 60 or over (“pensioner couple”). The higher bound figures also include older 
people living as part of a larger household, for example an older person living with a relative, 
who would otherwise appear in the “other” category. 
5. Some households would fit into more than one of these categories (e.g. a pensioner in receipt 
of Income Support and Attendance Allowance would fit into both the first and fourth 
categories). In these cases, households are classified in the top-most category (in the order 
listed in the Table). 
6. One of the following benefits: Income Support, Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, or 
Income-based Jobseekers’s Allowance. 
7. One of the following benefits: Attendance Allowance, Disability Living Allowance, or 
Disabled Person’s Tax Credit. 
8. Using Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2000. This variable is not available for the Eaga 
database. 
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Table A2: Characteristics of Warm Front Grant Recipients 
  Private housing only 
 Share of all 
Warm Front 
grants 
(1) 
Share of non-
minor grants 
 
(2) 
Share of grant 
expenditure 
 
(3) 
 
Tenure: 
   
Owner-occupier 90% 93% 93% 
Private rented 10% 7% 7% 
 
Household type: 
   
Single adult 4% 4% 3% 
Single adult with children 14% 13% 10% 
Two adults with children 21% 20% 15% 
Single pensioner 23% 23% 31% 
Two pensioners 18% 19% 20% 
Other 19% 20% 20% 
 
Qualifying criteria1: 
   
Not eligible 
 
- - - 
60+ and in receipt of  
means-tested benefit2 
35% 37% 53% 
Families in receipt of 
means-tested benefit2 
11% 9% 7% 
In receipt of Working 
Families Tax Credit 
22% 22% 16% 
In receipt of disability-
related benefit3 
32% 32% 23% 
 
Income group: 
   
Bottom 20% 27% 27% 34% 
2nd quintile 30% 30% 30% 
3rd quintile 27% 27% 23% 
4th quintile 13% 14% 11% 
Top 20% 3% 3% 2% 
 
Region: 
   
North East 15% 16% 11% 
North West 36% 35% 37% 
West Midlands 20% 20% 23% 
London 8% 7% 7% 
South East 13% 13% 12% 
South West 9% 9% 9% 
    
Fuel poverty indicator4:    
Worst 20% of wards 55% 52% 55% 
20-40% 23% 24% 22% 
40-60% 10% 11% 11% 
60-80% 7% 8% 8% 
Best 20% of wards 5% 5% 5% 
 
 
 
 
   
 53
Table A.2 (contd.): Characteristics of Warm Front Grant Recipients 
 Private housing only 
 
 Share of all 
Warm Front 
grants 
(1) 
Share of non-
minor grants 
 
(2) 
Share of grant 
expenditure 
 
(3) 
Size of dwelling:    
1 bedroom 3% 2% 2% 
2 bedrooms 30% 29% 29% 
3 bedrooms 59% 62% 61% 
4+ bedrooms 8% 8% 8% 
 
Age of dwelling: 
   
Pre 1900 10% 8% 10% 
1900-1945 52% 51% 53% 
1946-1965 20% 22% 20% 
1966-1980 15% 16% 13% 
Post 1980 4% 3% 3% 
 
Thermal comfort: 
   
No central heating 27% 30% 56% 
Non decent home 48% 51% 69% 
 
SAP rating: 
   
Less than 30 21% 24% 38% 
30-50 41% 42% 39% 
50 or more 38% 34% 24% 
    
Source: Eaga Partnership Ltd database. 
Based on data from Eaga’s database of all Warm Front recipients in the areas they cover. SAP ratings 
were kindly provided by the Energy Audit Company. Includes information on 389,228 households in 
the private housing sector, who applied to Warm Front between April 2000 and December 2003. 
Results are based on non-missing values for each variable. The number of missing values is relatively 
small, except in the case of SAP variable where ratings have not yet been estimated for many of the 
more recent grant applicants (missing in 29% of cases).  
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Table A.3: Dynamics of fuel poverty, 1991-96 
 Required fuel spend as % of income: 1996 
Required fuel 
spend as % of 
income: 1991 
0-5% 5-7.5% 7.5-10% 10-12.5% 12.5-15% >15% 
0-5% 67% 20% 8% 2% 1% 2% 
5-7.5% 39% 31% 14% 9% 3% 5% 
7.5-10% 15% 28% 26% 15% 6% 10% 
10-12.5% 12% 15% 27% 22% 10% 13% 
12.5-15% 9% 20% 22% 16% 13% 21% 
>15% 14% 10% 12% 17% 12% 35% 
       
Source: Own analysis using longitudinal element of 1991 and 1996 EHCS.   
Lightly shaded box shows movements out of fuel poverty. Darkly shaded box shows movements into 
fuel poverty. 
 
 
Interpretation of Table A.3: 
Flows into and out of fuel poverty are not driven by small upward or downward movements 
across the 10% threshold. Many of those households who escape fuel poverty move well 
below the threshold and many of those households who fall into fuel poverty move well 
above the threshold. For example, just over half of the households who were marginally fuel 
poor in 1991 (in the 10-12.5% category) were no longer fuel poor in 1996. Of those that 
‘escaped’ fuel poverty, half had moved up at least two categories (i.e. to 0-5% or 5-7.5%). 
Similarly, around 30% of those who were just below the fuel poverty threshold in 1991 (i.e. in 
the 7.5-10% category) had become fuel poor in 1996 and half of these had moved down at 
least two categories (i.e. into more severe fuel poverty). 
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Table A.4: Dynamics of Fuel Poverty: 1991-96 
  Incidence: 
Percentage in 
fuel poverty in 
1991 
Persistence: 
% still fuel 
poor in 1996 if 
fuel poor in 
1991 
Entry rate: 
% fuel poor in 
1996 if not fuel 
poor in 1991 
All households 28% 57% 12% 
 
By household type: 
   
Single pensioner  63% 75% 30% 
Pensioner couple 33% 51% 22% 
Single with children 68% 59%* 24%* 
Couple with children 12% 36% 6% 
Single without children 33% 54%* 11% 
Couple without children 16% 55%* 8% 
Large adult household 27% 54%* 14% 
 
By tenure: 
   
Private 21% 56% 10% 
Social 51% 60% 26% 
 
By income: 
   
Low income (bottom 20%) 91% 63% 28%* 
Other 17% 52% 12% 
 
By SAP rating: 
   
Under 30 56% 62% 20% 
30-50 27% 59% 12% 
50 and over 15% 45% 10% 
    
Source: Own analysis using longitudinal sample of 1991 and 1996 EHCS. 
Based on a sample of 2,598 dwellings with complete data on household incomes and required heating 
costs in 1991 and 1996. To ensure consistent comparisons over time, the income measure used to 
identify fuel poor households does not include housing benefit (since data on HB is not available for 
1991). Estimates of required heating costs for both years are based on the methodology used in the 
1996 EHCS Energy Report.   
Asterixes indicate small cell size (<100). 
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Table A.5: Experience of expenditure fuel poverty by household characteristics 
 
 Experience of fuel poverty 
over 4 waves: 
Initial household characteristics  
(in wave 7) 
Occasional 
fuel poverty 
(1-2  waves) 
 
Persistent 
fuel poverty 
(3-4 waves) 
 
Persistent 
fuel poor as 
% of all 
fuel poor 
observations 
 
All households 
 
13.6% 4.3% 44% 
By family type:      
Single pensioner 21.8% 12.1% 56% 
Pensioner couple 8.4% 3.5% 52% 
Single with children 31.8% 11.8% 39% 
Couple with children 8.3% <0.5% 8% 
Single without children 18.6% 4.0% 38% 
Couple without children 8.5% 1.5% 28% 
 
By tenure:    
Owner-occupier 11.5% 3.4% 44% 
Private rented 16.0% 8.6% 50% 
Social rented 21.5% 6.9% 42% 
 
By income group:   
 
Bottom 20% 35.1% 15.2% 45% 
Other 6.4% 0.7% 32% 
 
By eligibility for Warm Front:   
 
Eligible 23.0% 9.5% 47% 
Not eligible 11.3% 3.1% 41% 
    
Source: Own analysis using waves 7-10 of the British Household Panel Survey.  
Based on a sub-sample of 2,582 households with complete data on incomes and fuel expenditure in 
waves 7-10.   
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ANNEX B:  
 
Imputation of Household Income for Warm Front Applicants 
 
Regression imputation is the most appropriate technique in this context, because it 
makes the most efficient use of the information available on grant recipients in order 
to estimate their household income. The analysis was also carried out using hot-deck 
imputation, which is an alternative (and popular) method of imputation, and the 
results were very similar.  
 
Household income is estimated as a function of various household and dwelling 
characteristics, using data from the Family Resources Survey (FRS), which includes 
an accurate measure of household income. These regression equations are then used 
to impute the incomes of grant recipients in the Eaga database with similar 
characteristics to those in the FRS. Fortunately, Eaga’s database contains quite a 
range of variables that are common to the FRS and that are closely correlated with 
household income, including receipt of certain means-tested or disability benefits (the 
‘qualifying benefit’), household composition, size of property, tenure, and region. 
(The closer the correlation between these variables and household income, the more 
accurate this imputation process.) Care was taken to ensure these variables were 
defined in a consistent way across both datasets.  
 
Data for the households in the 2000/01 and 2001/02 FRS are pooled in order to 
increase sample size. This generates a total sample of over 40,000 households in 
England. Incomes are imputed using the sub-sample of 10,000 households who meet 
the eligibility criteria for Warm Front (see below). 
 
Four separate regressions are run for each of the main categories of scheme 
applicants. Some households fit into more than one of these categories and so are 
included in more than one of these regressions.   
 
(1) Householder(s) aged 60 and over and in receipt of either income support, 
housing benefit, council tax benefit, or income-based job-seeker’s allowance; 
 
(2) Householders with at least one child under 16 and in receipt of one of the 
means-tested benefits listed above; 
 
(3) As above, but in receipt of the Working Families Tax Credit; 
 
(4) Households in receipt of one of the disability-related benefits, including 
Attendance Allowance and the Disability Living Allowance. 
 
In each case, the independent variable in these regressions is logged household 
income. (Income is logged to generate a better ‘fit’ and because it generates a more 
normal distribution of residuals). The dependent variables vary slightly between the 
four regressions, but include household composition (i.e. number of adults and 
children), tenure, age of the householder, number of bedrooms, and two dummy 
variables for those living in the South East or London. The explanatory power (as 
measured by the R2) is 30% or more for each of the four equations.  
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The resulting equations are used to predict the household incomes of grant recipients 
in the Eaga database. Where households fit into more than one of the four categories, 
they are classified in the order listed above – for example, the income of a single 
pensioner in receipt of both a means-tested benefit and a disability-related benefit will 
be imputed using the first regression, rather than the fourth one. This is designed to 
produce more conservative (i.e. lower) estimates of income.  To ensure that the 
distribution of imputed incomes matches the distribution of incomes in the FRS, a 
random error term is added to the predicted values in order to match the variance 
observed in the incomes of FRS households. This is important because using 
predicted values without any error term would under-estimate the number of 
households on very low (and very high) incomes and would, therefore, under-estimate 
the number of households in fuel poverty. 
The income measure used is net household income before housing costs, unadjusted 
for differences in household size. This includes housing benefit and disability 
benefits, in line with the definition of income used in the Government’s official 
estimates of fuel poverty for England.  
As we would expect, the imputed incomes of grant recipients are skewed towards the 
lower end of the income distribution (see Table below). For example, 27% of grant 
recipients have imputed incomes that are in the bottom quintile of incomes for the 
whole of England and only 3% of grant recipients are in the top quintile. 
Reassuringly, the distribution of imputed incomes for grant recipients is similar to the 
income distribution for all eligible households in the FRS. (We would not expect them 
to be identical, because grant recipients are not a random sample of eligible 
households; for example, they contain a higher proportion of owner-occupiers.) 
 
 
Distribution of incomes (and imputed incomes) 
 % of households in each income group 
 All h/holds 
(FRS) 
 
All eligible 
h/holds 
 
Warm Front 
grant recipients 
(imputed) 
 
Bottom quintile 20% 30% 27% 
2nd quintile 20% 35% 32% 
3rd quintile 20% 22% 26% 
4th quintile 20% 10% 13% 
Top quintile 20% 3% 3% 
    
Source: own imputations and analysis using Family Resources Survey 
 
We repeated this analysis using various alternative definitions of income. The Table 
below shows that the results (for the proportion of grant recipients in fuel poverty) are 
very sensitive to the income measure used. Column (4) uses an income measure that 
is similar to the one used in a recent report by the Energy Audit Company (Wilkinson 
et al, 2003), who estimated that between 30-44% of grant recipients were fuel poor 
prior to receiving a grant, excluding single adults and “other” households.  
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Sensitivity of Results to Different Income Measures 
Proportion of grant 
recipients in fuel poverty 
(est.) 
HBAI1 
unequiv-
alised 
incomes 
BHC 
(1) 
As (1) less 
housing 
benefit 
 
 
(2) 
As (1) less 
all housing 
costs  
 
 
(3) 
As (1) less  
housing 
benefit and 
disability 
benefits2 
 
(4) 
As (1) less all 
housing costs 
and disability 
benefits2 
 
(5) 
 
All households 18% 20% 27% 26% 34% 
All h/holds, excluding 
single adults and ”other” 
h/holds 
21% 24% 31% 29% 38% 
 
By household type: 
     
Single adult 19% 25% 33% 46% 53% 
Single adult with children 11% 17% 30% 18% 32% 
Two adults with children 5% 6% 13% 7% 15% 
Single pensioner 43% 48% 55% 56% 63% 
Two pensioners 17% 17% 23% 26% 34% 
Other 5% 6% 8% 10% 14% 
      
1. HBAI stands for Households Below Average Income, which is the Government’s official income 
measure (see the Department for Work and Pensions website for more details).  
2. Excluding benefits that are designed to compensate for the additional costs of being disabled, including 
Disability Living Allowance and Attendance Allowance. 
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ANNEX C: 
 
Measuring Fuel Poverty in Expenditure Terms  
 
This Annex examines whether fuel poverty measured in expenditure terms is a 
reasonable indicator of fuel poverty, as officially defined (which is based on required 
expenditure, rather than actual spending). A household is expenditure fuel poor if they 
are spending more than 10% of their income on fuel. This may differ from the official 
measure of fuel poverty for three reasons: 
 
• some people who are fuel poor may under-spend on their heating and live in a 
cold home or only heat part of their home adequately (e.g. because they can't 
afford to heat their home adequately, they prefer to spend money on other 
items, or their heating system is unable to heat their home satisfactorily 
however much they spend); 
 
• some households spend more than 10% of their income on fuel even though 
they are not fuel poor (e.g. because they are over-heating their home or they 
have special needs that are not taken into account in estimates of required 
heating costs); 
 
• errors in measuring required heating costs or actual fuel expenditure. 
 
There are two possible types of error (Type I and Type II): 
 
• ‘wrongly excluded’: those who are not classified as fuel poor (in expenditure 
terms), but are fuel poor according to the official measure; 
 
• ‘wrongly included’: those that are classified as fuel poor (in expenditure 
terms), but are not fuel poor according to the official measure. 
 
The size of both these types of error can be analysed using a sub-sample of the 
English House Condition Survey, for which there is information both on required 
heating costs and actual fuel expenditure. This comparison shows that, if a 10% 
expenditure threshold is used, 72% of those who are fuel poor in expenditure terms 
are also fuel poor on the official definition, whilst 52% of those who are fuel poor on 
the official definition are also fuel poor in expenditure terms. So, there appears to be a 
significant amount of overlap between the two measures of fuel poverty (i.e. a 
relatively low proportion of ‘wrongful inclusions), although there is a relatively high 
proportion of ‘wrongful exclusions’. (Using a 9% expenditure threshold reduces the 
proportion of ‘wrongful exclusions’ to around a third, but increases the proportion of 
‘wrongful inclusions’ to around a third, as well.)  
 
The Table below compares the characteristics of those who are fuel poor under the 
two different definitions of fuel poor (using a 10% threshold in both cases). The 
proportion of ‘wrongful exclusions” (i.e. those who are fuel poor, but are not picked 
up as being fuel poor using the expenditure measure) is greatest for single pensioners, 
those living in low-SAP properties, those without central heating, and those who are 
very dissatisfied with their heating system. Hence, these households will be under-
represented among the expenditure fuel poor. 
The proportion of ‘wrongful inclusions’ (i.e. those who are identified as being fuel 
poor in expenditure terms, but are not fuel poor on the official definition) is greatest 
for single parent households and those living in high-SAP properties who spend  
a relatively high proportion of their income on fuel. These groups are, therefore, over-
represented among the expenditure fuel poor.  
 
 
Composition of fuel poor households, 1996 
 
 
Official measure of 
fuel poverty 
Expenditure-based 
measure of fuel 
poverty 
(10% threshold) 
 
All households 20% 14% 
 
By household type: 
  
Single adult 13% 16% 
Single with children 5% 9% 
Two adults with children 5% 5% 
Single pensioner 36% 30% 
Two pensioners 17% 18% 
Other 24% 23% 
 
By tenure: 
  
Owner-occupier 57% 57% 
Private rented 19% 12% 
Local authority 21% 26% 
Housing association 4% 6% 
 
By income: 
  
Bottom quintile 62% 59% 
2nd quintile 31% 35% 
3rd quintile 6% 4% 
4th quintile 1% 2% 
Top quintile 0% 1% 
 
By SAP rating: 
  
Under 30 30% 20% 
30-50 55% 57% 
50 and over 15% 24% 
   
By heating system:   
No central heating 25% 16% 
Has central heating 75% 84% 
   
Source: Own analysis using the sub-sample of 2,081 households in 1996 English House Condition 
Survey with fuel expenditure data. Of these, 475 households were fuel poor according to the official 
definition of fuel poverty and 356 households were fuel poor in expenditure terms.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
This glossary provides a brief explanation of some key terms as they are used in this 
report. 
 
Churn:  
A term sometimes used to describe movements into and out of fuel poverty over time. 
The occupants of a dwelling can move in or out of fuel poverty either because of 
changes in their financial circumstances or because they move to a more or less 
energy efficient home. 
 
Cost-effective(ness): 
The cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency improvements is a measure of the 
potential fuel savings per pound spent. A particular measure is more cost-effective 
than another if it generates larger potential fuel savings for the same amount of 
expenditure. The cost-effectiveness ratio (as reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 to 4.6) is 
equal to the average potential annual fuel savings divided by the average annualised 
cost of improvements (see also the notes to Figure 4.1). 
 
Coverage: 
This is the proportion of the target group that are eligible for a scheme. In this case, 
the target group is all vulnerable and fuel poor private sector households. 
 
Fuel poor: 
According to the principal definition used by the Government for target setting, a 
household is in fuel poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, it 
would be required to spend more than 10% of its income, including Housing Benefit 
or Income Support for Mortgage Interest (ISMI) on all household fuel use for heating 
and non-heating purposes. 
 
Fuel poverty gap: 
This is the difference between what households can afford to spend – conventionally 
assumed to be 10 per cent of their household income – and what they would need to 
spend to heat their home satisfactorily and meet other fuel use requirements (for 
lighting and appliances), aggregated over all fuel poor households. This measure takes 
into account the depth or severity of fuel poverty, as well as the numbers in fuel 
poverty. 
 
Micro-simulation model: 
Micro-simulation models are computer models that operate at the level of the 
individual or, as in this case, the household. Such models can be used to simulate the 
impact of policy changes (in this case a large scale programme of energy efficiency 
improvements) on a large representative sample of households in order to draw 
conclusions that apply to higher levels of aggregation (in this case the whole 
population of England).  
 
Minor measures: 
This includes draught-proofing, hot water tank jackets, and/or energy efficiency light 
bulbs. 
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SAP: 
Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) for the energy rating of dwellings is a 
calculation of a building’s energy efficiency. SAP ratings are scored on a scale from 1 
to 120 where 1 is the worst and 120 the best.  
 
Self-selection effect: 
In this context, this refers to the possibility that certain types of household may be 
more likely to apply for a grant than other households that also meet the eligibility 
criteria. For example, we might expect those who are living in the least energy 
efficient homes and who, therefore, stand to benefit most from the scheme, to be more 
likely to apply for a grant (i.e. to self-select themselves into the scheme). 
 
Significant measures:   
These cover new central heating systems, cavity wall insulation, and/or loft insulation. 
 
Vulnerable households: 
In the context of the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy, a household is vulnerable if it 
contains a member aged 60 or over, a child under the age of 16 or someone who is 
disabled or has a long term illness.  
 
Warm Front Plus:   
Householders that are aged 60 or over and are in receipt of a means-tested benefit are 
eligible for Warm Front Plus, which has a higher grant ceiling of £2,500 (as opposed 
to £1,500 for other Warm Front recipients) and offers a package of measures 
including new central heating systems (for those without central heating), in addition 
to the measures available under Warm Front (i.e. cavity wall insulation, loft 
insulation, draught-proofing, and other improvements to the heating system). 
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